LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
JUN 20 1963
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BF408
.P59

CORNELL STUDIES IN ENGLISH

VOLUME XVI
EDITED BY
LANE COOPER



Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola
After a Portrait (Venetian School)
Now in the Municipio of Mirandola

MAR 15 1963
THEOLOGICAL SE

CORNELL STUDIES IN ENGLISH
XVI

GIANFRANCESCO PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA ON THE IMAGINATION

THE LATIN TEXT
WITH AN INTRODUCTION, AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, AND NOTES

BY

HARRY CAPLAN

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF CLASSICS
IN CORNELL UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED FOR CORNELL UNIVERSITY
NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1930

Copyright, 1930, by Yale University Press.
Printed in the United States of America.

The expense of publishing this volume was borne by a grant from the Heckscher Foundation for the Advancement of Research, established by August Heckscher at Cornell University.

TO MY MOTHER

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. Introduction 1

II. Dedicatory Epistle from Aldo Manuzio to Alberto Pio 13

III. Dedication by Pico to Maximilian I 17

IV. On the Imagination 23

Chapter 1 25

Chapter 2 27

Chapter 3 31

Chapter 4 33

Chapter 5 39

Chapter 6 41

Chapter 7 43

Chapter 8 49

Chapter 9 57

Chapter 10 63

Chapter 11 81

Chapter 12 85

Index 99

GIANFRANCESCO PICO ON THE IMAGINATION

INTRODUCTION

Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (born *c.* 1470—died, by the hand of his nephew Galeotto, October 16, 1533), humanist, scholar, and poet, spent the earliest years of his life[1] under the influence of his famous uncle Giovanni Pico, and of his uncle's friends such as Battista Guarini, Antonio Cittadini da Faenza, Battista Mantuano, and Marsilio Ficino. A marked tendency to reconcile Christian and classical thought is observable in the writings of both uncle and nephew; the works of both are permeated with a distinct mysticism. The younger Pico pursued his scholarly activities in friendly relation with the foremost men of letters of his day, among them Ariosto, Bembo, Calcagnini, Lilio-Gregorio Giraldi, Sadoleto, Ercole Strozzi, Pirckheimer, and Alberto Pio; and among his acquaintances were Wimpfeling, Peutinger, and Reuchlin. He was thus abreast of the learning of his time, and indeed was himself in high repute among his contemporaries. His letter to Giraldi,[2] *c.* 1516, gives an account of his literary labors; this, and the list of his works published thereafter, show that he composed something in almost every field of intellectual interest. How such industry was possible, and how such excellence was achieved, it is difficult to understand when one considers the incessant and violent warfare within his family for the possession of Concordia and Mirandola, a struggle that engaged his time and energy from 1499 until his assassination. What with attack, defense, negotiations, victory, defeat, exile, bloodshed, almost constant insecurity, we need not be astonished at his repeated complaint over the tumultuous life he led. And his lament is for his interrupted studies.

---

[1] The fullest biography is a doctoral dissertation, *Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola*, by Gertrude Bramlette Richards (1915, typewritten), Cornell University Library, press no. T 1915 R 515.

[2] It appears, for example, in Turino Turini, *La Strega*, Milan, 1864, pp. XIII–XXIV.

De Imaginatione is a short, and an early, product of his thought, but a solid work. Without excessive praise of its merits, one may assert that it commends itself at once to students of psychology, of moral philosophy, of the intellectual life of the Renaissance, and of literary criticism. The psychologist of our day, even if he disregarded all speculative elements in the treatise, should find this body of doctrine from the pre-modern period devoid neither of historical interest nor of immediate value. To examine this work of Pico might well accord with the modern tendency[1] to look back to the ancients for the light they cast on human behavior, in fields, outside of experimental psychology, where direct observation can be effective. In like degree, Pico's synthesis of ethics and psychology should interest the student of philosophy. Again, this treatise on the imagination represents a branch of Renaissance learning that has received little attention from students of that period.[2] If Melanchthon's *De Anima* was valuable in its day, and so valuable for nearly two hundred years thereafter that it has been singled[3] out as a great contribution to psychology from the Renaissance, its inadequate treatment of the imagination only enhances Pico's achievement in comparison. Further, Pico's tract is of special service to us in understanding the religious opposition, within the humanism of that day, to the paganizing of culture. And finally, for the student of literature, to whom the imagination and its ways are a necessary and lasting subject of investigation, Pico's distrust of free play in the phantasy may illustrate that tendency of thought[4] which, when carried over into literature, challenged men to justify the creative imagination.

The chief source of Pico's material is Aristotle's *De Anima;* and, when he adopts this, he follows it closely in descriptive and physiological method. But actually he is eclectic, drawing from most of the great traditions to which his time was heir; he levies on Plato, Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, the Peripatetics and the Arabs, on the Stoics, and on the Augustinian and theological psychology. He uses or mentions Plato, Alcinous, Proclus, Synesius, Giovanni Pico, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Priscianus Lydus, Themistius, Averroes, Avicenna, Epictetus, Cicero, St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, and St. Thomas Aquinas, and Gerson and other Parisian Scholastics. Of course the philosophies of these writers often had much in common, and were mutually interactive; one need only recall the heavy draft of Neoplatonism upon Aristotle. And hence we cannot trace each and every notion of Pico to a specific source. Doubtless he shows a direct inheritance from the Platonic and Neoplatonic belief in the reality of immaterial ideas, and from the doctrine of the struggle between the higher and the lower self; so too, in common with Christian mystics generally, he inherited the consequent distrust of imagination because it deals with the inferior world of sense and experience. Likewise from Platonism and Neoplatonism his treatise derives the dualism of the corporeal and incorporeal realms, the intermediate position of the phantasy with respect to them, and the resultant view, a useful one in the face of difficulties, that the nature of phantasy cannot be comprehended by philosophy. Here, of course, Synesius and Augustine were in the line of transmission. The Stoics, again, in exalting reason, depreciated imagination, and thus bequeathed a doctrine that was welcome to the Middle Ages; this legacy is betrayed by a deep impress upon the tenets of Pico. The strong moral bent of his treatise takes some of its force from the *Ethics* of Aristotle, from Plato and the Neoplatonists in their ethical leanings, and from the Stoic emphasis upon virtue. All these streams were confluent with Christian doctrine, and helped to swell its mighty current. The Peripatetics Pico has consulted, though, wisely, he is unaffected by their over-refinements of Aristotle; and similarly his use of the Scholastic philosophers in no way impairs the simplicity and general clearness of his system.

---

[1] G. S. Brett, *Psychology Ancient and Modern*, New York, 1928, pp. 27 ff.

[2] For example, studies would be welcome of Francesco Vicomercati's Commentary on Aristotle, *De Anima*, Book 3, Paris (J. Roygni, 1543); Jean Deniset's *De Animi Natura*, Paris, 1577; Thomas Fyens' *De Viribus Imaginationis*, Louvain, 1608; and Hieronymus Nymann's *De Imaginatione Oratio*, Wittenberg, 1613.

[3] Brett, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[4] Cf. Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*, bk. 2; Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, part 1. sect. 2. mem. 3. subs. 2; J. E. Spingarn, *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century*, Oxford, 1908, 1. x-xi.

Where traditions clash, Pico at times refuses to take a definite position. Thus he is unwilling to repudiate Aristotle and Averroes so as to accept Galen on the seat of the imaginative power. But he sides with Aristotle in rejecting Plato's doctrine of innate ideas. And he remains essentially true to Aristotle when, against the weight of mediæval opinion, he insists on the identity of phantasy with imagination. (For this reason I have in the translation used these two terms interchangeably). Again, Pico conforms, not with Aristotle, but with Boethius, who was influenced by Neoplatonism, and so with many mediaeval epistemologists, when he posits four main faculties that operate with the objects of experience—I do not for the present include the mystic light of Faith; to sense, imagination, and reason, he adds intellect. His distinction between reason and intellect is clear, if not complete; we may question whether a fuller treatment of the difference would have been germane to a work primarily dealing with the imagination; Pico is not offering us an entire theory of the mind. At any rate his discussion of the higher powers of the soul makes it plain that he would not have accepted the more recent view, in modern psychology, that resolves all the higher mental processes in a theory of external stimuli and sense-perception.

De Imaginatione is a research in psychology and ethics, not in 'aesthetics.' In Aristotle's *De Anima*, with its physiological method, there was no place for a treatment of the poetic imagination, although the author in that work[1] recognized the activity of the productive imagination (φαντασία βουλευτική) in molding the forms of nature to the purposes of art.[2] Pico, accordingly, says nothing of the uses of this constructive imagination for artistic activity, although he is aware of its combinatory power, and of the distinction between it and the perceptual, reproductive, phantasy (Aristotle's φαντασία αἰσθητική). He neither takes any notice of the studies on imagination by the ancient authorities on rhetoric, nor gives any sign of acquaintance with Aristotle's

---

[1] 434^a 7.

[2] See J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition*, Oxford, 1906, p. 305.

Poetics.[1] It is true, Aristotle does not there discuss the phantasy; whether Pico, if he had read the *Poetics*, would have dwelt on the power and use of imagination in the fine arts is a matter for speculation only. One might suspect that a natural outcome of his distrust of imagination would in his case be a sympathy with the views of his friend Savonarola, who had had to meet the charge of hostility to free imagination.[2] Pico would, one thinks, have been at home in the literary criticism of the Age of Reason—would have found himself in accord with Hobbes' belief that the essential element in poetry is reason, would have appreciated the bias which prompted Dryden to suspect the imagination as 'a wild, lawless, faculty,' would have stressed the principle of artistic restraint, and doubtless would have condemned romantic literature, at the time when by that term[3] was meant the product of an unregulated imagination. But on this point the absence of an explicit discussion of art[4] by Pico precludes us from definite argument. Where he does allude to imaginative literature, as, for example, to the visions in the Bible, it is extolled on ethical grounds. Since the highest concern in life is conduct, good and blessed living, the imagination is tested by its service to right action. Although both good and bad, and all of either, can come from the imagination, it is, fundamentally, a power with a great capacity for evil. It can corrupt the reason, and even deceive the intellect. It is vain, wandering, and partly brutish. The sway of passions, mental afflictions, all the defects of judgment and opinion are attributable to it. Therefore the higher powers of the soul must with excellent thoughts curb its instigation to wrong-doing, in protection of the civil, philosophic, and Christian life. Not the imagination, but the intellect, is the eye of the soul, the transcendent faculty, the informing power, which not only makes intelligible those impressions that are perceptually derived, and turns them into laws and abstractions, but cognizes ultimate truth in things when they are purified from all contact with matter. Put the imagination, then, under the guidance of intellect and reason, and its supra-sensual element will predominate. Now, such is the relation between the imagination and the higher faculties that they cannot do without it; only let them guide it therefore, and it may act as the lens through which the intellect beholds the truth, it may prove to be the instrument of good prophecy, it may have part in the revelations of faith, and on it, as on wings, the mind may rise to the contemplation of things divine. With the elevation of intellect in prayer, imagination may itself be elevated beyond its own nature, and ascend to God. But even here Pico's concept of the imagination scarcely rivals the exalted Imagination Wordsworth conceives of in the *Prelude* (see, for example, Book 14, lines 188–192, 206–209)—or the 'divine' Imagination of Blake's *Jerusalem*.

---

[1] This work was not included in the Aldine Aristotle of 1495–8. The *editio princeps* appeared eight years after *De Imaginatione* was written. Yet G. Valla's translation was published in 1498, and Pico's friend Politian possessed one of the Laurentian Mss.

[2] See J. E. Spingarn, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, New York, 1899, pp. 14 ff., and P. Villari, *Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola*, tr. L. Villari, New York, 1888, 1. 103 ff. and 2. 148 ff. on Savonarola's *De Divisione ac Utilitate Omnium Scientiarum.*

[3] Cf. L. P. Smith, 'Four Romantic Words,' in *Words and Idioms*, London (Constable), 1925, esp. pp. 68–76.

[4] Nor, from the point of view of a theory of art, is Pico's *Libellus de imitatione* (written in 1512, and published in several editions) very enlightening. In the 1523 edition of this essay (Bologna, Hieronymus de Benedictis) Bembo's reply and Pico's answer to Bembo also appear.

Pico's treatise, then, is empirical, in the elements it derives from Aristotle; and it is mystical, in the elements drawn from Plato and the Neoplatonists, and from Christian theology. But the author not only uses theological doctrines; throughout, in matter and manner, he evinces the preconceptions of a devout Christian. To Pico, even intellect, the supreme power of the soul which allies the soul with God, needs strengthening by faith and prayer.

Though the treatise is not written in a distinguished style, and though in vocabulary and syntax it shows many variations[1] from the Latinity of the classical period, yet it is for the most part dignified and lucid. The work is logically divided and ordered; it proceeds by a consistent method of definition, demonstration, and conclusion. The examples and quotations are apt, and in the main accurate; but seldom do they expose the writer to the charge of vague allusion. A good share of the incidental matter is illuminating; thus the reference to Pico's method in education, and his vivid discourse upon death, will command the interest of every reader.

---

[1] Perhaps most interesting is the use of *morbus* as of masculine gender in chap. ix, p. 58, l. 23, and as a neuter, doubtless equivalent to *malum* or *vitium*, in the same chapter, p. 62, l. 9, and in the first sentence of chap. x. Note also the indicative *est* in an indirect question in the first sentence of chap. viii, and the indicative *resistendum est* in an indirect question in the first sentence of chap. ix.

In constructing the text of the *De Imaginatione*, I have used the two available editions that appeared during Pico's lifetime: *V*, 4°, without pagination (thirty-nine leaves), published at Venice (Aldo), and dated, at the end of the tract, April 1501; and *S*, in fol., unpaged (nine leaves), edited by Mathias Schürer, and published at Strassburg by Johann Knobloch on January 31, 1507 (the date of the editor's note at the end of Pico's works) along with other of Pico's works: *De Rerum Praenotione; De Fide Theoremata; De Morte Christi et Propria Cogitanda; De Studio Divinae et Humanae Philosophiae; Vita J. Pici; Defensio de Uno et Ente; Epistolae; Justini Liber ad Gentes in Latinam Conversus; Expositio textus Decreti De Consecratione Distinctio II Hilarii; Staurostichon de mysteriis Germaniae heroico carmine.*

The edition I have called *V*, with its graceful round characters, is justly celebrated as one of the best products of Aldo's press, and testifies to the high regard in which the great publisher held his patron and friend. Its rarity has led to a belief that only a small number of copies was printed.[1] The dedicatory epistle from Aldo to Alberto Pio appears only in *V*.

The present editor is alone responsible for the punctuation, and for the division of the text into paragraphs. He has also thought it best to normalize the spelling, which, as one expects, shows little consistency in either edition, and considerable variety when the two are compared; the spelling, then, has been adjusted to the norm of the Latin of a better period. It is hoped that these changes will aid the reader. Of course the abbreviations and suspensions of the original texts have not been preserved.

---

[1] See A. Firmin-Didot, *Alde Manuce*, Paris, 1875, p. 139.

There is no significant variation between the two texts. I have not recorded petty typographical errors, of which there are several in *S*, and more in *V*. My collation has made it evident that a few errors are common to both, and suggests that *S* may have been copied from *V*. But we are fortunate in having, in the Strassburg collection, a table of *corrigenda* compiled by Pico himself. For example, on the title-page the title appears as *De divini amoris imaginatione: Unus;* this Pico corrected in the table by deleting *divini amoris*. The editor's note at the end of Pico's works in that collection expresses regret that the author's preoccupation with public and domestic affairs prevented him from revising and editing his work before its final appearance.

Hain, *Repertorium Bibliographicum* 13004, records an earlier, separate, edition of *De Imaginatione:* Rome, 1500, 4°. This edition I have been unable to find listed in the catalogue of any library; if it ever saw the light, I assume that it now is lost. Nor do I find evidence other than in a reference by Tiraboschi, *Biblioteca Modenese*, Modena, 1783, 4. 113, to prove that there was an edition issued at Venice (Aldus Romanus), 8°, in 1505. There are several copies extant of the special issue of the treatise which appeared at Basel (Henricus Petrus), 12° (often listed as 8°—for example, *Bibliothèque Mazarine* 28765), March, 1536, covering forty-five leaves, and entitled: *De Φαντασία, Io. Franc. Pici Mirandulae liber, in quo quae imaginationis facultas, natura, quaeque si erroris causa est, quibusque remediorum praesidiis occurri possit*. The last separate edition of *De Imaginatione* I know only from one copy, in the *Universitätsbibliothek* at Basel (Roth 211, No. 2): *De Phantasia aureolus sane Iohannis Francisci Mirandulae*[1] *Liber, in quo, etc.*, 12°, covering thirty-nine leaves, printed at Wittenberg in 1588 by Matthes Welack. The editor's identity is hidden in the initials M. I. L. H. Pico's dedication to Maximilian is lacking in these last two editions.

[1] Pico's name again appears in this form in the editor's *Praefatio* to this edition.

The Strassburg collection of Pico's works (1506–7) appears to have been his third, having been preceded by a quarto edition of two works, Bologna, 1496, and by a folio edition of four, place of publication not indicated, 1500(?).[1] According to Tiraboschi, the works in the Strassburg collective edition were again published at Paris in 1508, and a fuller collection was published at Basel in 1557. In the later and better-known collections of 1572-3 and 1601, both published in folio at Basel, Pico's works appear together with the *Opera Omnia* of his uncle. The treatise *De Imaginatione* naturally does not appear in the two earliest editions of the works. I have no information on the precise contents of the editions of Paris, 1508, and Basel, 1557, to which the not always trustworthy Tiraboschi refers; as identical with those of the Strassburg edition, they would, of course, include the *De Imaginatione*. But the treatise does appear in the two collections printed at Basel in 1572–3[2] and 1601.[3]

There are, therefore, in addition to *S* and *V*, four extant editions of the tract, one of Wittenberg, 1588, and three of Basel: the separate edition of 1536, and the editions in the two collections of 1572–3 and 1601. A careful examination of these four has produced nothing of value for constructing the text. Not only are the common errors of *S* and *V* preserved in all, but numerous additional errors of a typographical nature are observable in the Basel edition of 1536, and in the other two editions of Basel even glaring misreadings—for illustration, I note only *illumine*, chap. xii, p. 92, l. 18. The Wittenberg edition, however, does give some evidence of revision—for example, it contains the proper reading *insidientur*, chap. viii, p. 56, l. 20. None shows the use of Pico's table of *corrigenda* in *S*; and it appears likely that the editions of 1536, 1572–3, and 1588 were copied from *V*, and that the edition of 1601 was copied from that of 1572–3.

At some time Pico had evidently written a Commentary on the *De Anima* of Aristotle, since in his letter to Giraldi he says:

---

[1] See Catalogue of the British Museum G 11761 (2).

[2] 2. 132–153.

[3] 2. 90–105.

'*De Anima rationali in Aristotlelem scripsimus Commentaria*,' and since the inner title of his extant *De Animae Immortalitate Digressio*, Bologna (Hieronymus de Benedictis), 4°, July, 1523, reads: '*Ex commentariis Joannis Francisci Pici . . . . in tertium Aristotelis De Anima librum extracta Digressio De Animae Immortalitate.*'[1] As early as Tiraboschi (*op. cit.* 4. 118) it was doubted that the bulk of the Commentary ever appeared in print; in any event, if published, it is now lost. It is regrettable that this work is not available for our fuller understanding of Pico's contribution to psychological theory.

I have been fortunate enough, at the time of going to press, to examine what may be a unique copy[2] of Jean-Antoine de Baïf's translation of *De Imaginatione* into French—the only translation of the treatise of which I have learned. It is not annotated and does not include the dedication; and while generally sound, it is not always successful in subtler passages.

In closing this Introduction, I wish to record my gratitude to several friends for valuable advice and criticism, and in particular to Professors Lane Cooper and James Hutton.

---

[1] Cf. also the first words of the *Digressio*: 'Locus ad quem perventum est nos admonere videtur ut de immortalitate animae ab expositione Aristoteli contextus digredientes disseramus.'

[2] *Bibl. Monac.* Ph. Sp. 641: *Traitté de l'Imagination tiré du Latin de Françoys Pic de la Mirandole. Par I. A. D. B.*, Paris (André Wechel), 8°, 1557. Another edition, in 16°, was issued by the same publisher in 1577.

ALDUS ROMANUS
ALBERTO PIO CARPENSIUM PRINCIPI
S.P.D.

Adeo verum est, Alberte doctissime, quod aiunt, plurimum incendi homines ad studia maiorum exemplo, ut cum quis exstiterit ex aliqua familia clarus vel doctrina, vel armis, omnes fere ex ea nati illius gloriam maxime aemulentur; atque hinc puto Romanos olim rerum dominos maiorum suorum statuas et eorum illustrium ordine domi positas summa cura habuisse, quo juvenes illorum gloria ad aliquid praeclare agendum incenderentur, ut et ipsi digni quibus statuae erigerentur evaderent; ipsas quoque res publicas claris viris statuas identidem erexisse. Quod temporibus nostris, ut alia praeclara, ita et hoc in primis, exsolevit. Nam qui suorum statuas domi habeat nemo est; publice autem sic raro fieri solet, ut nos vix semel, idque Venetiis, ubi aliqua priscae illius antiquitatis vestigia remanent, viderimus.

Incendimur profecto plurimum ad virtutes et studia exemplo et gloria nostrorum; et ne longe exempla petantur, te ad sapientiae studium, quo jam excellis, et avus excitat Albertus, qui non minus

---

[1] Aldo Manuzio, Alberto Pio, and the Picos were bound by close ties of relationship. Giovanni Pico was a fellow-student and lifelong friend of Aldo, and chose him to direct the education of his sister's son, Alberto Pio. Alberto became the intimate and protector of his teacher, was associated with him in the Aldine Academy, granted him the right to add *Pius* to his name, and was an executor of his will. In appreciation of his pupil's friendship and pecuniary support, Aldo dedicated to him the greater number of the more important works published at the Aldine press—the texts of Aristotle, Lucretius, and Suidas among them.

To Gianfrancesco Pico had been dedicated the first Greek Grammar in Latin (Bolzani's), printed by Aldo. It was largely because the Lord of Mirandola was his patron and friend that Aldo took exceptional care to print *De Imaginatione* in a font so beautiful. See A. Firmin-Didot, *Alde Manuce*, Paris, 1875, esp. p. 155; but observe his blunder in the statement, p. 139, that the treatise on Imagination was printed after Gianfrancesco Pico's death. Firmin-Didot may here have been confusing Giovanni with Gianfrancesco Pico.

DEDICATORY EPISTLE

ALDO ROMANO TO ALBERTO PIO, PRINCE OF CARPI: GREETINGS

The example of their ancestors it is, so men say, my deeply learned Alberto,[1] that most effectively enkindles men with zeal for study; a saying so far true that, when some person has stood forth illustrious in scholarship, or in arms, almost all who have sprung from his line especially emulate his glory. And that, indeed, is why I think the Romans, once masters of the world, were very careful to have statues of their ancestors and men of distinction regularly set up in their homes, so that the glory of those great men might inspire the youth to carry on some enterprise in a splendid manner, and become worthy to have statues reared to themselves. I think that is why states, too, have often erected statues to famous men. But, as other excellent institutions have in our days gone out of fashion, so too, and notably, has this. No one now has statues of his kinsmen in his home; and, for the public, the practice has become so uncommon that I have hardly ever seen one—even at Venice, where still some traces of that good old past abide.

Yes, we are aroused to virtues and studies most of all by the glorious example of our own kin. Not to seek illustrations far afield, thou art inspired to the study of philosophy, in which already thou dost excel, by thy grandsire Alberto,[2] who

Alberto's loyalty to Gianfrancesco was steadfast throughout their lives. Not only did the Prince of Carpi afford his cousin a refuge in exile; he even aided him in an expedition (1506) to gain possession of Mirandola, when Pico's brothers were in control. See G. B. Richards, *Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola*, Cornell University Library, press No. T1915 R 515 (1915, typewritten), pp. 33 and 36. Gianfrancesco dedicated to Alberto *De Morte Christi* and *De Studio divinae et humanae Philosophiae*, and also addressed to him the *Prooemium* to the *De Rerum Praenotione*.

For a sketch of Pio's life and character, see G. Tiraboschi, *Storia della Letteratura Italiana* 7.266 ff.

[2] Died in 1463 or -4. A brief account of his life, dealing largely with his military activities, may be found in Pompeo Litta, *Famiglie Celebri Italiane*, Milan, 1819-76, vol. 1.

litteris quam armis claruit, et avunculus Johannes Picus, homo undecumque doctissimus. Hoc eodem sic excitatur ad bonas litteras Johannes Franciscus Mirandulanus Princeps amitinus tuus, ut jam tot opera quot patruus composuerit, quae fere omnia impressa visuntur. Idem nunc in Psalmos Commentaria quae patruus morte praeventus emendare non potuit, accurate recognoscit, mirum opus et doctrinae plenum.

Eius ipsius De Imaginatione librum, cum superioribus diebus imprimendum curassem, placuit ad te, cui omnia debeo, dono mittere, quod scirem fore tibi gratissimum, tum ipso opere, tum etiam quod a Johanne Francisco amitino tuo sit editus, atque Aldi typis diligenter excusus. Vale.

---

[1] Either this statement is an exaggeration, or several works of Gianfrancesco Pico published before 1500 are not known to us. See Tiraboschi, *Biblioteca Modenese*, Modena, 1783, 4.414.

shone as bright in letters as in arms, and by thine uncle Giovanni Pico, a man most erudite in every field. By the latter, too, thy cousin Gianfrancesco Pico, Prince of Mirandola, is so drawn to literature that already he has composed as many works as did his uncle, and almost all of these are in print.[1] He is now carefully editing the Commentary on the Psalms, a remarkable work replete with learning, which his uncle was prevented by death from revising.[2]

His own book on Imagination, after recently seeing it through the press, I have decided to send as a gift to thee, to whom I owe everything; for I knew that it would bring thee great delight, by virtue of the work itself, and also because thy cousin, Gianfrancesco Pico, was its author, and it was carefully printed at the press of thy friend Aldo. Farewell.

---

[2] This Commentary by Giovanni Pico on the Psalms apparently never was published; we have only his Commentary on Psalm 15, *Opera Omnia*, Basel, 1572, 1.334–339. Miss Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 119, mentions a Commentary on the Psalms by Gianfrancesco, which was destroyed in the sack of Mirandola in 1533; she does not give her source of information.

SACRATISSIMO CAESARI MAXIMILIANO
ROMANORUM REGI AUGUSTISSIMO
JOHANNES FRANCISCUS PICUS
MIRANDULAE DOMINUS CONCORDIAEQUE COMES

Scribit Eusebius Pamphili, summe regum Maximiliane Auguste, videri sibi gentium philosophos, si aut inter se aut cum aliis compararet, claros illos quidem viros fuisse; si vero eos ipsos philosophis theologisque conferret qui veri Dei cultui vacassent, inanes et frivolos. Sic mihi de te fari liceat, augustissime Caesar. Visi enim summa et aestimatione et gloria digni multi qui hunc quem tu felicissime insides Romani imperii thronum conscendere, si vel inter sese vel aliis cum regibus diversarum gentium et nationum conferantur. Tecum autem collati (absit tam ab[a] instituto meo quam a castissimis tuis auribus adulatio) subsidere gradus non parum multos conspicientur. Tantus enim et sublimis adeo tuarum virtutum cumulus, ut vetustorum saeculorum gloriam, et antiquitatis illius undequaque laudatae famam superaveris. Ut enim praeteream quae paene puer adversus contumaces gentes et rebelles populos, non per legatos, sed per te ipsum gesseris, fusosque et fugatos potentissimos hostium exercitus, captas urbes, detriumphata proelia;

[a] Ab: om. S.

---

[1] A search through Eusebius has not revealed the source of this statement.

[2] The fulsome adulation of the context belies the apparent sincerity. Abject humility of this sort in communications addressed to Roman Emperors is to be regarded as a rhetorical commonplace, the practice having its historical roots in the Panegyrists of the Empire. See E. A. Freeman, *The Panegyrists of the Fourth Century*, in *Historical Essays, Third Series*, London, 1879, pp. 117–121, and H. Caplan, *The Latin Panegyrics of the Empire*, in *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education* 10 (1924). 41 ff.

[3] To learn in how far this high evaluation is confirmed by historical fact, see A. W. Holland, art. *Maxmilian I* in the *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th ed. Holland numbers among the Emperor's personal qualities: physical robustness, simplicity of habits, a conciliatory disposition, catholic tastes, and intrepidity on the field of battle, all of which brought him wide popularity. He showed a friendly attitude to scholarship by reorganizing the University of Vienna, and by his

DEDICATION

GIANFRANCESCO PICO, LORD OF MIRANDOLA AND COUNT OF CONCORDIA, TO THE MOST HOLY CAESAR MAXIMILIAN, MOST AUGUST EMPEROR OF THE ROMANS.

O noblest of Kings, Maximilian Augustus, Eusebius Pamphili writes that in his view the pagan philosophers were truly illustrious men whether mutually compared or compared with other pagans, but when confronted with the philosophers and theologians who have devoted themselves to the worship of the True God, they are empty and insignificant.[1] In this vein may I be permitted to speak of thee, most august Caesar. Many who have ascended this throne of the Roman Empire, which thou very happily dost occupy, have seemed worthy of the highest esteem and glory, whether they be compared one with another, or compared with other rulers of various races and nations; when compared with thee, however—and let flattery[2] be as far from my purpose as from thy most virtuous ears—the stature of these predecessors will be seen to shrink in no small measure. Indeed, so great and lofty is the accumulation of thy virtues,[3] that thou hast surpassed the glory of ancient generations and the fame of that antiquity which is lauded the world over.[4] I pass by, for instance, the exploits thou hadst achieved as a mere boy, I might say, against contumacious tribes and insurgent peoples, not through lieutenants, but by thine own efforts; the puissant armies of thine enemies dispersed and put to flight, cities captured, and

---

patronage of scholars. But he had undesirable characteristics; not only did he display vanity in his own writings but also 'he was reckless and unstable, resorting often to lying and deceit, and never pausing to count the cost of an enterprise or troubling to adapt means to ends. . . . As a gifted "amateur" in politics, he increased the disorder of Germany and Italy, and exposed himself and his Empire to the jeers of Europe. . . . He undertook wars solely for private aggrandizement or personal jealousy.'

[4] *Undequaque.* See Krebs-Schmalz, *Antibarbarus, s. v.*

ut item decora pacis taceam cum bellicis certantia—quanta se mihi offert seges scribendique materia, si ad acumen ingenii, corporis robur, rerum linguarumque peritiam, si ad prudentiam, justitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam, liberalitatem, clementiam, pietatem, reliquasque in homine raras, in principe rarissimas virtutes me converto. Quas Dei maximi optimi munere cumulate adeo possides, ut tecum natae, altae, immo in alios a te mutuo profectae videantur. Sed dabitur olim fortasse (ut est in votis) tantillum otii atque quietis, ut prosequi latius ista diligentiusque pro virili possim, futura posteritati in exemplum et profutura. Fecerunt olim virtutes istae tuae, magnanime Caesar, me tibi eo devinctum, ut nihil antiquius optabiliusque mihi in rebus humanis contingere posse arbitrarer, quam tuae maiestati in re aliqua vel belli, vel pacis, vel utriusque gratificari. Tanta autem proposito huic meo accessio facta est ob ea quae in me parum alioqui nisi ex fide meritum beneficia contulisti, ut ex ipso desiderio quaedam prope necessitas suborta sit.

Quapropter cum ad praesens se mihi nil offerat te dignum, existimans tamen novarum lucubrationum, qualescumque illae sint, dicationem tibi non ingratam fore, librum hunc nostrum et ad te mittere et sub tuo nomine publicare voluimus, rati et futurum id apud te non solum fidei nostrae et observantiae testimonium, sed et pignus cudendi in tuo nomine [sed et][a] rerum tuarum, uti maiora, ita et meliora. Namque inter tot fragores

[a] Sed et VS.

---

[1] In 1479 Maximilian defeated Louis XI and the French at Guinegatte. Soon after, he suppressed an uprising in Gelderland, and in 1485 a rebellion at Utrecht. The Turks were defeated by him at Villach in 1492. Two years later he again dealt with Gelderland. In the year before Pico wrote this treatise, the Emperor conducted a campaign against the Swiss. His activity in Italy really dates from 1495, when, leagued with Venice, Spain, Milan, and Pope Alexander VI, he sought to drive out Charles VIII of France.

[2] Not all of this encomium is without a basis in fact. Maximilian was an extremely versatile man, of extraordinary physical powers and mental cultivation. He knew something of six languages, and was conversant in several fields of intellectual inquiry. See A. W. Holland, *art. cit.*

[3] One of Maximilian's occasional favors to Pico was the conferring upon him, on February 5, 1501 (two months after this dedication was written), of the title

battles crowned with success.[1] I am likewise silent on thy honorable attainments in peace, which vie with thy doings in war. Yet what a harvest offers itself to me, what a matter for literary elaboration, whether I turn to thy keenness of mind, thy strength of body, thy knowledge of affairs and languages,[2] or turn to thy foresight, justice, bravery, self-restraint, liberality, kindness, or piety; or I turn to the other virtues, rare in an ordinary man, exceedingly rare in a ruler, which by the bounty of God, Greatest and Best, thou dost possess in such rich abundance that they seem to have been born with thee, nourished with thee—yes, and by thee lent to others. But at some time mayhap to me shall be vouchsafed (as the phrase reads in prayers) such modicum of peace and quiet as will enable me, according to my powers, to recount more extensively and more carefully thy accomplishments, which are destined to be a heritage of example and benefit to posterity. Long since have thy virtues, great-hearted Caesar, held me bound to thee, and to such an extent, that nothing, as I thought, in human affairs could be better or more desirable for me than the gratification of thy Majesty in any matter of war or peace, or both. Moreover, the benefits which thou hast conferred upon me,[3] (who little merit them, save it be from fidelity) have given me for this task an additional stimulus so great that, from the very desire, a certain necessity, almost, is laid upon me.

And so, though at present nought worthy of thee offers itself to me, yet, prompted by the belief that a dedication of some recent studies, whatever their value, will not be unpleasing to thee, I have wished to publish beneath thy name this my book, and to send it to thee, expecting that it will serve not only as a testimonial of my fidelity and regard, but also as an assurance that with thy consent I shall mold in words the greater of thy exploits and the nobler as well.[4] Amid all the crash of arms,

---

of Gilded Knight. See in F. Ceretti, *Biografie Pichensi*, Mirandola, 1909, 2.52–8, the diploma in which other honors also are accorded to Pico.

[4] So far as can be ascertained, Pico never fulfilled this promise.

armorum et tumultuantis Italiae strepitus, curasque a meis finibus arcendorum quoquo modo hostium, suffurati non nihil otii sumus ut haec nostra de imaginatione meditata conscriberemus, futura fortasse lectoribus (si qui erunt) non inutilia, nisi et ipsa nos imaginatio nostra fefellerit.

Reliquum est, maxime Caesar, qua te fide et pietate possum, deprecer, ut sanctissimum illud propositum tuum vindicandae in pristinam libertatem Christianae rei publicae quam citius fieri possit, adimpleas. Concutitur ab externis hostibus, ab internis laceratur; et Jesu Christi, domini nostri, sanguine circumseptum et consecratum ovile peius multo perpessum est, indiesque patitur, a lupis sub ovina quam sub propria pelle grassantibus. Age igitur jam, Caesar optime, et excitis qua ratione potes Christianis regibus. Te Christo, regum omnium regi, oves suas tam ab hostibus quam a perfidis pastoribus jam jam liberaturo, fidum ministrum exhibe.

Mirandulae Kalendis Decembribus, anno ab Christi incarnatione millesimo quingentesimo.

---

[1] The period of foreign aggression resulting in the political disintegration of Italy began in 1494, when Charles VIII of France, urged on chiefly by Lodovico Sforza, Milanese usurper, planned to acquire Naples, as the first step in realizing his ambitions, which included the capture of Constantinople, and his hope of being crowned Emperor of the East. The league against Charles was formed in 1495; see p. 18, n. 1.

[2] From 1499 to 1501, Gianfrancesco Pico was at war with Anton Maria, his father's youngest brother, for the possession of Concordia; and in the very year of the writing of this tractate he was disputing for the title of Mirandola with his own younger brothers Lodovico and Federico. In fact, a month before the date which he affixed to the Dedication, he had sent an ambassador to Ferrara to attempt a compromise with his brothers. Maximilian never very actively assisted Gianfrancesco in his family disputes; and his moral support was wavering and inconsistent. See Richards, *op. cit.*, chap. 3. Miss Richards, p. 105, writes: 'As early as 1490 the political degeneration of Italy had begun, and no prince in the land suffered more from military campaigns than did Pico.'

[3] As Miss Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 117, says: 'Pico was a most prolific writer. When one thinks of the multiplicity of his occupations, and of the tempestuous vicissitudes of his political life, one is astonished by the number of his works,

and uproar of Italy in tumult,[1] and amid the cares of repulsing my enemies[2] somehow from my territories, I have snatched some little leisure[3] in which to write these thoughts of mine on Imagination which—unless my own imagination deceives me—will perhaps be not without value to readers, if any of these there be.

It remains for me, O greatest Caesar, to entreat thee as I can, by faith and loyalty, to fulfil that most sacred intention of thine, of restoring the Christian State as quickly as possible to its pristine liberty. It is shaken to its foundations by enemies from without;[4] it is torn by enemies from within.[5] And the sheepfold fenced round and consecrated by the blood of Jesus Christ, our Lord, has suffered far worse—day by day suffers worse—from wolves going about in sheep's clothing than does a sheepfold from wolves that prowl in their own hides. Therefore come now, most excellent Caesar, rouse up the Christian rulers in what manner thou canst. Show thyself a faithful minister of Christ, the King of all kings, who soon, soon, shall liberate His sheep as well from their enemies as from their faithless shepherds.

Written at Mirandola, on the first of December, in the fifteen-hundredth year[6] of the incarnation of Christ.

---

and the wide range of subjects covered.' Pico's letter to Giraldi lists works embracing almost every department of literary activity: natural philosophy, theology, Biblical criticism, biography and history, grammar, rhetoric and oratory, dialectic, logic, arithmetic, geometry, music, astrology, psychology, translations into Latin, epistles, hymns, poetry.

[4] The wars against the Turks were now being prosecuted.

[5] See Miss Richards, *op. cit.*, chap. 5, on Pico's support of Savonarola, and his firm attitude in favor of reforms in the clergy, despite his close friendship with Pope Leo X. Essentially, Pico was a humanist rather than an active reformer; and, as the spirit informing the present treatise helps to show, a Christian humanist.

[6] Cf. Pico's reference, on p. 91, to the age of his son Giantommaso as 7 at the time of writing. Giantommaso was born in 1492.

JOHANNIS FRANCISCI PICI
MIRANDULAE DOMINI CONCORDIAEQUE COMIT

LIBER DE IMAGINATIONE

A BOOK ON THE IMAGINATION, BY IANFRANCESCO PICO, LORD OF MIRANDOLA AND COUNT OF CONCORDIA

PICUS DE IMAGINATIONE

[I]

De Imaginationis Nomine, et quod Varie appellata est et Quas ob Causas. Caput primum.

Scripturis nobis de imaginatione, id recto ordine discutiendum occurrit, quid hoc ipso imaginationis nomine significetur, ut facilius commodiusque de eius essentia et proprietatibus vitiisque et remediis disseramus. Ea igitur animae vis, quam Graeci φαντασίαν nuncupant, Latine imaginatio dicitur, idque nomen de officio sortita est, ex imaginibus scilicet, quas concipit et effingit in sese. In eam namque advehuntur per quinque exteriorum sensuum instrumenta—visum, auditum, olfactum, gustum, tactum—rerum quae forinsecus sunt similitudines speciesve, imaginationum seges uberrima. Quicquid enim sub sensum cadit, hoc est, corporeum omne quod cerni, quodve ullo sensu sentiri potest, similitudinem atque imaginem sui quantum potest effundit ad imitationem[a] incorporeae spiritalisque naturae; quae vires suas inferiori mundo communicat ad imitationem ipsius Dei, qui bonitate sua infinita longe lateque diffusa condidit et conservat universa. Bonitatis enim proprium communicare se; nec aliam reddidit Plato rationem cur Deus mundum condidisset, nisi quia bonus erat. Sed de his hactenus, quandoquidem non eorum hic locus.

Quoniam autem de sensu phantasia proficiscitur, ut mox explicabitur, visusque sensuum omnium praecipuus est, ob id vis haec animae apud Graecos, Aristotele auctore, phantasiae nomen de lucis videlicet argumento obtinuit, sine qua videre non

[a] Imaginationem V.

---

[1] *Timaeus* 30.

[2] *De Anima* 429^{a}. φαντασία and φάος are from cognate roots φαν- and φαϝ-.

PICO ON THE IMAGINATION

CHAPTER I

On the Word 'Imagination;' that the Imagination has been called by Different Names, and Why.

As I am to write on the imagination, it strikes me that correct order requires me to discuss the meaning of this word 'imagination,' so that I may dwell more easily and advantageously on the essence and properties of imagination itself, and on its faults and their cures. Now this power of the mind, which the Greeks term φαντασία, in Latin is called *imaginatio*. And this name it received from its function; from the images, that is, which it conceives and forms in itself. To it there are carried through the instruments of the five exterior senses, of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, the likenesses and impressions of things which are from without—a very rich harvest of phantasies; for whatever the object of sensation, and that means everything corporeal which can be perceived or felt by any sense, the object produces, in so far as it can, a likeness and image of itself, in imitation of incorporeal and spiritual nature. This spiritual nature communicates its powers to the inferior world in imitation of God himself, who in his infinite goodness, spread far and wide, has established and preserves the universe. Indeed, it is the characteristic mark of goodness to communicate itself; and Plato has presented no other reason why God established the world except that *He was good*.[1] But enough of such reflections, since here is not the place for them.

Inasmuch as phantasy has its starting-point in sense, as will soon be explained, and inasmuch as sight is the most important of all the senses, among the Greeks (Aristotle is my authority) this power of the soul received the name of *phantasy*, doubtless from the instrumentality of light [φάος],[2] without which sight

est. Phantasia siquidem, ut Suidas refert, quasi φαοστασία[a] τις est enim inquit phantasia ἡ τῶν φανθέντων στάσις; nostra autem potestatis huius nomenclatura tam potestatem ipsam denotat quam eius actum, quem solum Graecorum nuncupatio videtur significare. Ea ipsa a Platone quandoque pictura appellata est idque propterea crediderim, quod in eius sensorio pingantur rerum species, afformenturque effigies variae proque voto fabricentur, non secus ac varias difformesque rerum formas pictores delineent.

[II]

Quod Varia de Imaginationis Natura a Philosophis Scripta sunt Item Differe Eam a Sensu, Opinione, Ratione, Intellectioneque. Capu Secundum.

De ipsius autem imaginationis natura veteres olim scriptores non consenserunt. Eorum enim perpauci inter eam atque alias animae vires discrimen posuere. Nam et Homerus et Empedocles aliique non modo ab imaginatione sensum non dirimebant, sed ne a mente quidem atque intellectu, qui imaginativa potestate sublimior multo altiorque est, quam inferior sit sensus vi phantastica. Plato vero (quod ei Themistius aliique et Graeci et Arabes philosophi ascribunt) eam non sensum modo, sed sensus etiam opinionisque complexionem arbitratus est esse. His vero omnibus Aristoteles quique eum secuti refragantur, exquisitissimis speculationibus decernentes differre imaginationem a sensu opinioneque, atque ab intellectualis animae potestatibus, utpote quae propriam in animali sedem propriasque functiones sortiatur.

[a] Variant reading in Suidas for φανσταςία; see Bernhardy, *Suidas: Lexikon*, *s.v*

---

[1] Cf. W. A. Hammond, *Aristotle's Psychology*, London, 1902, Introd., p. lvii 'The word is used by Aristotle to mean both the faculty of imagination and the product of imagination.'

[2] *E.g.*, *Philebus* 39^{d}: ζωγράφημα.

[3] Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima* 427^{a}.

[4] See *Sophist* 264^{b}.

is impossible. Phantasy, as Suidas represents it, is 'a condition of light,' so to speak, *φαοστασία τις*—for he says phantasy is 'the state of things come to light,' *ἡ τῶν φανθέντων στάσις*; but our term for this power denotes the power itself just as much as its product, which latter is the only thing the Greek word[1] seems to signify. Phantasy likewise has sometimes been called 'picture'[2] by Plato, and for the reason, I should suppose, that in its sensorium are painted the impressions of things, and the various appearances receive form and are fashioned at will, in a manner not unlike that in which painters depict the various and dissimilar forms of things.

CHAPTER II

That Various Things have been Written on the Nature of Imagination by Philosophers. Further, that Imagination Differs from Sense, Opinion, Reason, and Intellection.

On the nature of imagination itself, however, ancient writers are not agreed; very few of them have posited a difference between it and other powers of the soul. Both Homer and Empedocles, for example, and others,[3] failed to distinguish sense, not only from imagination, but even from mind and from the intellect, which is as much more sublime than the imaginative power, and superior to it, as sense is inferior to the imaginative power. But Plato (according to the doctrine which Themistius and others, both Greek and Arab philosophers, ascribe to him) believed that imagination is not sense alone, but rather a complex of sense and opinion.[4] On the other hand, Aristotle and his followers opposed all these thinkers, having by the most searching investigations determined that imagination differs from sense and opinion, and also from the powers of the intellectual portion of the soul,[5] since to it are assigned its own special seat in the living being and its own special functions.

---

[5] Aristotle, *De Anima* 428ᵃ ff. This section of *De Anima* is the source for most of Pico's observations in the present chapter.

Sensus enim si proprii sensilis species per instrumenta quae affecta aut laesa non sint interstitio justo in se suscipiat, verus est. Imaginatio vero vana plurimum et oberrans; cuius componendi[a] gratia instans commentandi negotium suscepimus. Et ille quidem praesentibus, dumtaxat sensilibus, fit, a quibus scilicet excitatur exsurgitque et evadit actu, qui prius potentia quiescebat; haec vero abdicata etiam et remota re sensili munus obit suum. Quin immo et ea non modo quae fuere jam concipit, sed quae futura aut suspicatur, aut credit, et quae etiam a parente natura gigni non posse praesumit; quorum nihil ad sensum, cuius partes apprehendere retentareque praesentium rerum similitudines. In somnis praeterea imaginamur, non autem sentimus. Ad haec qui excaecati sunt per imaginationem colores, per sensum autem utpote capti oculis minime percipiunt. Animalia sine phantasia nonnulla, sine sensu nulla visuntur. Rursus, cum rem quampiam certe sentimus, non dicimus eam nobis videri; cum imaginamur autem hoc loquendi modo utimur. Quibus liquet sensum ab imaginatione differre.

Ab opinione item, rationeque, atque intellectione separari eam facile, uti arbitror, apparebit, si harum officia per se singillatim examinaverimus. Utitur anima virtute phantastica ad concipiendum proponendumque intellectui sensibilium tantummodo rerum similitudines. Utitur ratione ad inquirendum de eis arbitrandumque quae a corporeis etiam sequestrantur. Utitur intellectu ad contemplanda intellegibilia non a materia modo, sed ab omni materiae similitudine prorsus abjuncta. Opinatur

---

[a] componende VS.

[1] Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima* $428^{a}16$: 'Visions present themselves even if we shut our eyes.'

[2] The distinction between reason and intellect (cf. p. 81 ff.) is not characteristic of Aristotelian psychology; it was rather a persistent survival of the division made by Boethius, *Phil. Cons.* 5.4, tr. I.T. in the edition by H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, London and New York, 1918, p. 389: 'Likewise sense, imagination, reason, and understanding [*intellegentia*] do diversely behold a man. For sense looketh upon his form as it is placed in matter or subject; the imagination discerneth it alone without matter; reason passeth beyond this also, and considereth the species or kind which is in particulars. The eye of the understanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compass of the whole world it beholdeth with the clear eye of the mind that simple form in itself.' For a clear exposition of a common mediæval differentiation between intuitive intellect and discursive

Now a sense is unerring, if, at the proper distance, it receives in itself impressions of its special sensible through media which are sound and unimpaired. But imagination is for the most part vain and wandering; for the sake of proving this to be so I have assumed the present task of demonstration. Sensation is caused by present objects, provided that they are sensible. Excited by these, sense rises up and comes out in an act, while before it was potential and quiescent. Imagination, on the contrary, performs its function when the sensible object is rejected[1] and even removed. Nay rather, it conceives not only what now is no more, but as well what it suspects or believes is yet to be, and even what it presumes cannot be created by Mother Nature. None of these qualities belongs to sense, the function of which is to apprehend and retain the likenesses of present objects. Furthermore, in dreams we imagine, but do not employ sense. Here, too, we may note that those who have lost their sight perceive colors through the imagination; through sense they perceive colors not at all, being deprived of their eyes. There exist some animals without phantasy, but none without sense. Again, when by sense we definitely perceive a certain object, we do not say 'it seems to us'; but when we imagine, we do use this phraseology. From this it is evident that sense differs from imagination.

That imagination is likewise distinct from opinion, reason, and intellection, will, I think, be easily apparent if we examine their functions individually. The soul employs the imaginative faculty for conceiving likenesses of sensible objects only, and for placing them before the intellect. It employs reason for investigating these likenesses, and also for examining those things which are removed from bodily existence. It employs intellect for contemplating the intelligible things that are absolutely removed, not only from matter, but even from every likeness of matter.[2] On the other hand, the mind forms an

reason, cf. A. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen*, in *B.G.P.M.* (*Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalt.*) 4.5, Münster, 1903, p. 254. Isaac of Stella even distinguished between an *intellectus* and an *intellegentia*, and St. Bonaventure added to the list of faculties an *apex mentis;* see M. W. Bundy, *The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought*, Urbana, Ill., 1927, pp. 206–7.

autem anima, cum ex contrariis ratiocinationibus anxia deligit (quamquam non sine formidine decernendae falsitatis) in utram oblatae staterae lancem potius sibi vergendum sit, ut veri notitiam consequatur. Jam imaginari possumus pro arbitrio etiam quae non sunt, neque esse possunt; opinari autem vel scire factu impossibilia in nostra potestate non est. Cum terrificum item aliquod opinamur, metu concutimur; cum imaginamur, non magis afficimur quam si picturam aliquam horribilem contemplaremur, nisi eam imaginationem opinio consequatur. Brutis demum condonatum a natura est ut visis et imaginationibus polleant; solus ex omnibus animantibus homo ratiocinatur, opinatur, intellegit.

[III]

In quo Conveniat Imaginatio aliis animae Viribus; in quo ab eis Dissideat. Caput III.

Sed enim, quamquam ab eis quas memoravimus animae potestatibus imaginatio distat, non ea tamen intercapedine disjungitur ut nihil cum eis habeat commercii, sed eo usque proxima est, ut ex affinitate alterum saepe pro altero a philosophis boni nominis desumptum sit. In confinio namque intellectus et sensus posita est et medium inter utrumque locum tenet, et sequitur quidem sensum, cuius actu paritur; intellectionem autem antecedit. Cum sensu coit quia et particularia, quemadmodum ille, et corporea et praesentia percipit; praestat illi quia, nullo etiam movente, prodit imagines, nec praesentes modo, verum et praeteritas et futuras, et quae etiam promi a natura in lucem nequeunt. Consentit ei quia sensilibus speciebus pro objectis utitur. Eum vero praecellit, quoniam eas quae a sensu derelictae sunt, ipso etiam cessante, et sequestrat invicem pro arbitrio et copulat; quod fieri a sensu nullo pacto potest.

opinion when it is in a state of doubt arising from contrary reasonings, and chooses that scale of the proffered balance to which it had better incline for attaining the cognizance of truth—a choice, however, not unattended by fear of false decision. Now we can imagine at will even such things as are not, and cannot be; opinion concerning what cannot exist, or knowledge of it, is not in our power. Again, when we opine something fear-inspiring, we are shaken with terror. When we imagine, we are no more affected than if we were looking at some horrible picture, unless opinion follows upon this imagination. Finally, nature has endowed the brutes with the capacity to luxuriate in visions and imaginations; of all animate beings man alone reasons, opines, and cognizes.

CHAPTER III

Wherein the Imagination Harmonizes with other Powers of the Soul. Wherein it Disagrees with them.

Although imagination stands apart from those powers of the soul we have mentioned, yet it is not separated by so great an interval as to have no communication with them. Indeed, it is so near them that, from the close relationship, one has often been mistaken for another by reputable philosophers; for imagination is placed on the border between intellect and sense, and holds the intermediate ground. It follows *sense*, by an act of which it is born; *intellection* it precedes. It coincides with sense in that, like sense, it perceives the particular, corporeal, and present; it is superior to sense in that, with no external stimulus, it yet produces images, not only present, but also past and future, and even such as cannot be brought to light by nature. It accords with sense in that it employs sensible forms as objects; but it surpasses sense in that at will it separates and in turn combines those forms which sense upon ceasing to function has abandoned. This activity can in no way be performed by sense.

Intellectui convenit utpote quae libera, vaga, nullique rei peculiariter addicta. Praecellitur autem quoniam sensilia particulariaque tantum concipit et effingit; ille praeter haec universalia et intellegibilia, abque omni materiae contagio defaecata.

In foedus praeterea superiorum omnium virium venit, quandoquidem officio eo quod sibi natura impertiit frustrarentur, imaginatione non suffragante adminiculanteque. Neque enim aut opinari, aut scire, aut intellegere anima corpori alligata quicquam posset, nisi ei phantasia species ipsas identidem ministraret.

[IV]

Quid sit Imaginatio; item de Quaestionibus nonnullis quae praetermittuntur, et quam ob causam. Caput Quartum.

Satis jam, ut puto, quantum ad praesens attinet negotium, ostensum est quid imaginationis nomine significetur, quod ea cum aliis animae aut viribus aut actibus vel commercium habeat, vel dissidium. Quibus vero ea curiosius perquirere mens est, et Aristotelis et aliorum, qui eo duce philosophati sunt, commentationes De Anima et legendae et addiscendae sunt. Hoc etenim loco satisfactum fore putaverim, si ex iis quae in medium attulimus, descriptiones definitionesque eius asciverimus; ut sit imaginatio motus is animae quem sensus, in actu positus, parit; sit animae vis quae formas promat ex sese; sit omnibus viribus potestas agnata; effingat omnes rerum similitudines impressionesque virium aliarum transmutet in alias; sit potentia assimilandi cetera ad se ipsum. Quae aut omnia aut plurima, cum a Peripateticis, tum etiam a Platonicis abunde vestigata et reperta sunt.

Imagination conforms with intellect, in being free, unfixed, and devoted to no special object. But it is surpassed by intellect, since it conceives and fashions the sensible and particular only, while intellect, in addition, conceives and fashions the universal and intelligible, and such things as are purified from all contact with matter.

Further, imagination enters into alliance with all the superior powers, inasmuch as they would fail in that function which nature has bestowed upon each of them unless imagination support and assist them. Nor could the soul, fettered as it is to the body, opine, know, or comprehend at all, if phantasy were not constantly to supply it with the images themselves.

CHAPTER IV

What Imagination is. Likewise on some Questions which are overlooked, and why.

In my opinion, it has now been satisfactorily shown, so far as concerns the present purpose, what the word 'imagination' means, and wherein imagination corresponds or disagrees with the other powers or other activities of the soul. Certainly they who have a desire to investigate this subject more carefully should read and also learn the treatises *De Anima* of Aristotle and others who under his leadership applied themselves to philosophy. Indeed, at this point I should think it satisfactory to adopt, out of what I have adduced, the following descriptions and definitions of imagination; namely, that it is that motion of the soul which actual sensation generates; that it is a power of the soul which out of itself produces forms; that it is a force related to all the powers; that it fashions all the likenesses of things, and transmutes the impressions of some powers to other powers; that it is a faculty of assimilating all other things to itself—all or a very great part of which has been thoroughly investigated and ascertained by the Peripatetic philosophers and by the Platonic also.

Sed neque is quaestionis eius discutiendae locus, quae plurimos angit, sitne imaginatio a memoria et sensu communi et existimativa seu cogitativa virtute diversa, ut Thomas et Latini fere Aristotelis interpretes decrevere, an potius, ut alii, praesertim Alexander Aphrodiseus in institutione De Anima (quam e Graeca in Latinam linguam Hieronymus Donatus praeclaro vir ingenio et eleganti doctrina convertit), et Themistius in libris et De Memoria et De Insomniis voluere, sit unica tantum sensualis animae potestas, quae modo sensus communis, modo imaginariae facultatis, modo memoriae nomen pro functionum diversitate obtineat.

Praetereunda quoque nobis et illa quaestio est, quae plurimos torsit: de loco et sede imaginariae potestatis. Siquidem cor ei Aristoteles tribuit, Galenus cerebrum, Arabs Averroes,[a] inter

[a] Averrois VS.

---

[1] *Summa Theologica, Pars* I, *Q*. 78, *Art*. 4: 'It is not necessary to attribute more than four internal powers to the sensitive part of the soul: the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.'

[2] *Alexandri De Anima*, ed. I. Bruns, Berlin, 1887, pp. 68, 69.14 ff. (fol. 135*v* Ald.). Neither Alexander, nor Themistius in the two works mentioned below, makes the point so clearly as Pico would lead one to believe. Rather, Pico draws inferences from the general implications of the passages I refer to.

[3] There is a quarto edition of this translation, Brescia, 1495, in the British Museum (No. 1A.31237). Donato was a friend of Giovanni Pico; see W. P. Greswell, *Memoirs*, Manchester, 1805, p. 176, note *k*.

[4] Cf. *Themistii Paraphrases Aristotelis Librorum quae supersunt*, ed. L. Spengel, Leipzig, 1866, 2.233.20–29; 234.11–22; 240.1–241.15 (fol. 96 and 97).

[5] Cf. Spengel, *op. cit.*, 2.277.16-27; 288.1-10 (fol.102b,104).

[6] In Aristotle the common sense (*κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον*) is the place of reference for the things not exclusively belonging to any one special sense, but perceptible by two or more senses—number, magnitude, shape, unity, motion, time. But imagination and memory are included among its functions. By virtue of its image-receiving activity, imagination is a source of memory. To imagination, a phantasm is merely a picture; to memory it is a copy of a thing, and memory recalls that thing as an object of past experience. In memory time-perception is involved. Cf. *De Mem.* 450^{a}: 'In their essential nature the objects of memory are the same as those of imagination.' See Hammond, *op. cit.*, Introd. 1 ff.; J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition*, Oxford, 1906, pp. 292, 311–12.

[7] See *De Iuvent.* 467^{b} ff.; *De Partibus Animalium* 647^{b}; Hammond, *op. cit.*, Introd., p. lv and n.; E. Wallace, *Aristotle's Psychology*, Cambridge, 1882, Introd., p. 82 ff.; *Aristotle on the Parts of Animals*, tr. by W. Ogle, London, 1882, p. 168, n. 27; p. 172, n. 9; Brett, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–8.

[8] Cf. esp., in C. G. Kühn, *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, Leipzig, 1823, 3.615, 700 (*De Usu Partium Corporis Humani*, Bks. 8 and 9, respectively); 5.521, 606, 649 (*De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, Bks. 6, 7, 8, respectively); 6.73 (*De Sanitate Tuenda*, Bk. 1); 8.159, 174 ff. (*De Locis Affectis*, Bk. 3); 10.636 (*Methodi Medendi*, Bk. 9).

But this is not the place for discussing the question which troubles a great many: Is imagination different from memory, the common sense, and the estimative or cogitative faculty, as Thomas,[1] and, generally, the Latin interpreters of Aristotle, have decided? Or rather, as others would have it, particularly Alexander of Aphrodisias, in the treatise *De Anima*[2]—this has been translated from the Greek into the Latin tongue by Girolamo Donato,[3] a man of remarkable genius and refined learning—and as Themistius, too, would have it in his books *De Memoria*[4] and *De Insomniis*:[5] Is there only one, single, power of the sensitive soul, which, in accordance with its diversity of functions, is called now the common sense, now the imaginative faculty, now memory?[6]

We must pass over what has also tormented many—the question of the place and seat of the imaginative power. Aristotle[7] assigned to it the heart, and Galen[8] the brain, and the Arab

---

Cf. H. Siebeck, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Gotha, 1884, *Erster Theil, Zweite Abtheilung*, pp. 266 ff. And see Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 173 ff., for an excellent account of the history of opinion in psychologies of the Middle Ages concerning the location of the powers of the soul. Patristic and Scholastic writers who were unacquainted with Aristotle's works on natural philosophy followed Galen; writers who did know these Aristotelian treatises attempted to hold a mediate position between placing the soul in the heart, or in the brain. Thus Roger Bacon, *Opus Majus*, Part 5, first distinction, chap. 5 (tr. R. B. Burke, Philadelphia, 1928, 2.428–9): 'The sensitive soul has a twofold organ or subject; one is basic and the seat of life, namely, the heart, according to Aristotle and Avicenna in the books on Animals; the other is that which is first changed by the forms of qualities, and in which the operations of the senses are more manifest and distinguished, namely, the brain. For if the head is injured an evident injury is suffered by the sensitive faculties, and an injury to the head is more evident to us than one to the heart, and frequently occurs. For this reason in accordance with the more obvious consideration we place the sensitive faculties in the head; and this is the opinion of physicians who do not think that the origin of the faculties is in the heart. But Avicenna in the first book on the Art of Medicine says that, although the opinion of physicians is the more obvious to the sense, yet the opinion of the Philosopher is the truer one since all the nerves and veins and all the faculties of the soul have their origin first of all in the heart, as Aristotle proves in the twelfth book on Animals, and Avicenna in the third book on the same subject.' So also Albertus Magnus, *De Animalibus* Bk. 1, tract 1, chap. 5 (ed. H. Stadler, in *B.G.P.M.* 15, Münster, 1916, p. 26), represents the brain as taking the virtue of life from the heart, and with sense operating in relation to the heart. See Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 182, n. 2, for a table graphically setting forth where in the brain several of the mediæval philosophers placed the faculties of the soul. In most cases the *sensus communis*, *phantasia*, and *imaginatio* were assigned to the first *cellula*.

utrosque medius, procedere imaginandi vim de cordis regia dixit, et in capitis arcem conscendere, inibique sedem sibi domiciliumque constituere, sequestrandae etenim nobis ad praesens concertationes eius modi, tum ob earum difficultatem (ardua quippe eius modi perquisitio, nam, cum ipsa imaginatio intervallum sit incorporeae corporeaeque naturae, mediumque per quod conjunguntur, difficile est, ut inquit Synesius, naturam eius philosophia comprehendere), tum quia exactissime etiam pervestigata atque comprehensa huiusce modi veritas plus nimio proposito operi non conduceret. Illud enim quod plurimum habet momenti, immo fundamentum est susceptae commentationi, pro liquido et confesso apud philosophos et theologos est, haberi animae vim quae rerum similitudines et concipiat et effingat, et discurrenti rationi contemplantique intellectui subministret et serviat; cui phantasia sive imaginatio nomen sit positum. Pridem enim Avicennae explosa sententia est, qua phantasticam vim ab imaginaria diremit, et illa quoque eiusdem a bene audientibus philosophis exsibilata, quae illi potestatem et efficaciam supra naturae vires tribuebat.

[1] Cf. *Aristotelis Stagiritae Omnia quae extant Opera* (*Averrois Cordubensis in ea opera Omnes qui ad nos pervenere Commentarii*), Venice, 1560, vol. 9, *Averrois Colliget libri septem nuper diligentissime castigati* 2.11. The virtue which rules the common sense he places in the heart, as the heat-supplying organ; the heart actually has the primacy, since the brain serves this virtue.

[2] Cf. pp. 81, 83, and 85; Synesius, *De Insomniis* 4, Migne, *Pat. Gr.* 66. 1289; 'It [phantasy] is the most "common" sense, and the chief body of the soul. It dwells deep within us, and rules the living being as from a citadel'; Aristotle, *De Partibus Animalium* 670ª, applies to the heart the figure of an acropolis, or citadel.

[3] *De Insomniis* 4, Migne, *Pat. Gr.* 66.1292.

[4] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, *Pars* I, *Q.* 78, *Obj.* 6: 'Avicenna (*De Anima* 4.1, *Naturalium* Bk. 6) assigns five internal sensitive powers: common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.' See M. Winter, *Ueber Avicennas Opus Egregium de Anima*, Munich, 1903, pp. 28 ff. Winter divides the first three into: 1. *phantasia*, or *sensus communis; 2. imaginatio*, or *vis formans;* 3. *vis imaginativa* (in man, *vis cogitativa*). Cf. also Bundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 182 ff.

Although criteria varied among them, a distinction between phantasy and imagination was commonly made in the psychologies of the Middle Ages. Cf. C. Baeumker, *Witelo*, in *B.G.P.M.* 3. 2., Münster, 1908, p. 480; E. Lutz, *Die Psychologie Bonaventuras*, in *B.G.P.M.* 6. 4–5 (1909). 96 ff.; H. Spettmann, *Die Psychologie des Johannes Pecham*, in *B.G.P.M.* 20. 6 (1919). 53; A. Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 ff. Largely a Platonic and Stoic heritage to the mediæval period, the tendency grew to see in phantasy a power, for the most part subjective, which

Averroes,[1] taking an intermediate position, said that the imaginative power proceeds from the palace of the heart, and ascends to the citadel[2] of the head, where it establishes its seat and residence. But for the present we ought to lay aside disputes of this kind. We should do so, first, because of their difficulty; a thorough investigation of this sort is, of course, arduous, for, since the imagination itself is midway between incorporeal and corporeal nature, and is the medium through which they are joined, it is difficult to grasp its nature through philosophy, as Synesius says.[3] Secondly, we should do so because a truth of this character, even when most thoroughly examined and grasped, would not be of much use to our intended work. The proposition of greatest weight, nay, the foundation-stone of the discussion we have undertaken, the proposition which in the eyes of philosophers and theologians is a clear and admitted fact, is that there exists a power of the soul which conceives and fashions likenesses of things, and serves, and ministers to, both the discursive reason and the contemplative intellect; and to this power has been given the name *phantasy* or *imagination*. For the opinion of Avicenna,[4] whereby he separated the phantastic from the imaginative power, has long since been exploded, and that notion of his which attributed to phantasy supernatural powers of strength and efficacy has also been condemned by reputable philosophers.

operated with unreality, as in dreams—one might say the higher, more freely creative power; and to see in imagination rather the reproductive power, closely corresponding with the objects of sense—the Aristotelian φαντασία. In failing to make any distinction between phantasy and imagination, Pico frees himself from mediæval theory, and thus more closely follows Aristotle. See Bundy, *op. cit.*, chap. II, esp. pp. 34–6; and pp. 89, 188, 192 ff., 266. Yet also the inner and outer phantasty, which Scholastic philosophers felt were implied in the Aristotelian φαντασία (for example, cf. Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 96) were in part the origin of the distinction between a *phantasy* and a *vis imaginativa*, as with St. Bonaventure (Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 99) and Albertus Magnus (Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 161), the imaginative power usually representing the inner phantasy.

Despite modifications in some philosophies, this distinction seems to have been preserved with greater consistency in the Middle Ages than were the complex distinctions between fancy and imagination in the poets and literary critics of the nineteenth century in England; only in the caprice possible to phantasy from its greater freedom, can the mediæval view of *phantasia* and *imaginatio* be likened to the modern view which considers imagination as the loftier and weightier, and fancy as the lighter, gayer, and more arbitrary exercise of the power.

[V]

Animalium omnium Vitam atque Actiones magna ex parte Imaginationibus Regi. Caput Quintum.

Ab hac animae potestate non brutorum modo animantium actiones, sed et ipsius hominis vita plurimum pendet. Cum enim ad operandum moveatur nemo, nisi aut veri aut apparentis boni consequendi gratia, appetitusque ipse de cognitione pendeat (qui enim fieri potest ut appetamus incognita?), fateri opus est de ipsa notitia et desiderium potiundae rei produci, quam bonam credidimus, et vim motivam, qua voti animal fiat compos, excitari ab ea quodammodo et impelli. Quoniam autem e sensu cognitio proficiscitur, ut ab Aristotele multifariam prolatum est, et continua philosophantium successione receptum, sensusque ipse rei sensilis specie informatus ad phantasiam statim recurrit quasique in ea reponit quicquid forinsecus hauserit, imaginesque ipsae diutissime inibi permanent, et perpetuis sensibus simillimae sunt, corrogari oportet ex phantasiae imaginationisve natura animantium omnium operationes derivari. Siquidem bruta, ut mittamus auctoritatem Aristotelis in primo Metaphysices libro decernentis, quod memoriis videlicet et imaginationibus vivant, nil ea praeclarius altiusque possident. Cum enim per quinque exteriora instrumenta, quae modo sensus apparitores, modo janitores, modo canaliculi sensilis spiritus appellantur, deprompta ex rebus sensilibus species ad eam pervenerit, receptui canitur.

Homini autem contingit, ut magna ex parte imaginationem sequatur. Quod, praeter ipsam experientiam, Aristotelis etiam auctoritate didicimus. Accidit enim plerumque ut eius ratio aut praepediatur morbo, aut somno detineatur, quae licet obfuscaretur ⟨non⟩[a] numquam. Ob id tamen, quod necesse est

[a] non: om. VS; but Pico is following Aristotle, *De Anima* $429^{a}7$: τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι: Men [perform many actions under the influence of imaginations] because reason is sometimes obscured by passion, or disease, or sleep; cf. the Aldine Aristotle, 1497, f. 240^{v}.

---

[1] For example, *De Anima* 432^{a}: 'Without sense-perception one could not learn or understand anything; and at the time when one is actually thinking, one must have an image before one.'

CHAPTER V

That the Life and Actions of all Animate Beings are in great part Ruled by Phantasies.

It is not only the actions of animate brutes which depend on this power of the soul; to a very great extent so does the life of man himself. Since no one is moved to action except for the sake of obtaining a real or apparent good, and since desire itself depends on cognition (for how can we desire the unknown?), we must admit that knowledge itself produces the wish to obtain the object we have deemed good, and that it somehow excites and stimulates the motive force, by means of which the animal gratifies its desire. Further, inasmuch as cognition originates from sense, as in many places was contended by Aristotle,[1] and as has been accepted by a continuous succession of philosophers; and inasmuch as sense itself, when informed with the likeness of a sensible object, immediately has recourse to phantasy, and, so to speak, consigns to it what it has drawn in from without; and inasmuch as these images remain therein for a very long time, and are very like to perpetual sensations; therefore we must infer that the behavior of all animate beings arises from the nature of the phantasy—the imagination. Brutes (to adduce the authority of Aristotle, who expresses this opinion in the first book of the *Metaphysics*[2]), in that they live on memories and imaginations, possess nothing nobler or loftier than this imaginative power. When the impression drawn from sensible objects reaches their phantasy through the five exterior instruments which are called, now the servants of sense, now the door-keepers or the channels of the sensitive spirit, the signal for retreat is sounded.

Moreover, it is characteristic of man in great measure to follow phantasy, as we have learned from the authority of Aristotle,[3] as well as from experience itself. Man's reasoning is very often either impeded by disease or delayed by sleep, and may at times be obscured. Yet because it is not the less necessary that he who

---

[2] 980^{b}.

[3] *De Anima* 429^{a}.

eum qui ratiocinatur et intellegit, eodem Aristotele auctore, phantasmata speculari, fatendum nobis actiones nostras de eius potestatis ingenio plurimum dependere. Per imaginationem enim ad praesens intellego omnem sensualis animae interiorem vim, quibuscumque ea nominibus ab aliis censeatur.

[VI]

Quam necessaria homini Imaginatio, et quod ex ea tum Bona, tum Mala, oriri possunt, inibique quo Pacto, quove Ordine Intellegamus. Caput Sextum.

Imaginationem igitur non temere sed consultissime homini datam existimandum est. Cum enim ex rationali anima et corpore constituatur quasique compaginetur homo, differatque plurimum a terrena mole corporis spiritalis animae substantia, ex re fuit ut extrema medio opportuno conjungerentur, quod utriusque quodam modo naturam saperet, et per quod officiis anima etiam unita corpori fungeretur. Quid enim commercii rationalis pars cum stupida habitura esset, nisi phantasia intermedia, quae inferiorem naturam et praepararet ei quodam modo et cognoscendam apponeret? Ubi namque imaginatio rerum species recepit a sensibus, retinet in se, purioresque effectas offert agenti intellectui, qui suo lumine collustrans ab eis intellegibiles species abstrahit, quas in intellectum potentiae reponit, qui eis postea informatur atque perficitur.

Est enim rationalis anima, cum in corpus infunditur, veluti nuda tabula, in qua nihil pictum, nihil delineatum est. Quo fit

---

[1] See p. 38, n. 1.

[2] Pico's treament of the intellect, active and potential, even without the refined distinctions and modifications in definition and terminology which characterized the interpretations of the commentators on Aristotle, and the theories of knowledge of the Arabian and Scholastic philosophers, is here very rudimentary; it adds nothing useful to the persistent problem of interpretation generated by Aristotle, *De Anima* 428^a ff. See Hammond, *op. cit.*, Introd., pp. lxxi ff.; R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima*, Cambridge, 1907, Introd., pp. lviii ff.

[3] Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima* 430^a; and Wallace, *op. cit.*, Introd., p. cii, for the distinction between this simile and Locke's *tabula rasa*.

reasons and comprehends should observe phantasies (again on the authority of Aristotle[1]), we must admit that our actions for the most part depend upon the nature of this power; for under 'imagination' I at present comprehend the whole inner force of the sensitive soul, by whatever names it may be known to others.

CHAPTER VI

How necessary Imagination is to Man, and that from it not only Good but Evil can arise. And in what Way or in what Order we Comprehend in the Imagination

We must regard the imagination, therefore, as having been given to man, not without a purpose, but most deliberately. Since man is constituted of the rational soul and body, and is, so to speak, a conjunction of the two; and since the substance of the spiritual soul is very different from the earthly structure of the body; it naturally followed that the extremes were joined by a suitable mean, which in some way should partake of the nature of each, and through which the soul, even when united to the body, should perform its own functions. What communication would the rational part have with the irrational, if there were not phantasy intermediate, somehow to prepare for reason the inferior nature, and to set up this nature to be cognized? For when the imagination has received the impressions of objects from the senses, it retains them within itself, and, having rendered them more pure, furnishes them to the active intellect. This intellect in turn brightens these impressions by its own light, and draws off from them the intelligible ones, which it then places in the potential intellect.[2] And the potential intellect later is informed and perfected by means of these intelligible images.

When the rational soul is infused into the body, it is like a clean surface on which nothing has been painted, nothing delineated.[3] It follows, therefore, that it cognizes nothing out of

ut nihil cognoscat ex sese, sed omnem suam notitiam scientiamque ex sensibus phantasia intermedia nanciscatur.

Hoc Aristoteles ipse et qui eum secuti Parisienses theologi una voce pronuntiarunt, quamquam Plato et nonnulli etiam Peripatetici aliter sensisse videntur, quorum opinio, etiam si veritate fulciretur, nihil propositae quaestioni officeret. Nam etsi animam notionibus insculptam descendere in corpus Platonici asseverant, earum tamen oblivisci fatentur, unde ei necessarium sit sensus et phantasiae adminiculum ad reminiscendum. Verum enimvero licet necessaria sit, imaginatio bruta est tamen et recti judicii expers, nisi ducatu potentiae altioris adjuta, cui audiens hominem beat, obaudiens damnat. Nam si voluptatibus quae sensus illiciunt et ad inferna pertrahunt bene consulta restiterit, atque ad superna contenderit, rebellem sensum quamquam invitum et reluctantem eo perducet. Sin accingere se virtutis negotio renuerit sensibus obtemperans, tanta est eius vis ut et corpus afficiat et mentem obnubilet, efficiatque demum ut homo hominem exuat, et brutum induat. Qua de re non difficulter affirmare possumus, cum bona in universum omnia, tum mala, de imaginatione posse derivari.

[VII]

De Malis plurimis quae de Imaginatione prodeunt. Caput Septimum.

Sed quoniam hominum vita lubrica propensaque ad labendum et oberrandum, atque, ut sacrae litterae praemonent, ab adolescentia sua prona est ad malum, fit saepenumero ut quibus uti ad felicitatem deberemus, ad infelicitatem et miseriam abutamur. Nam si duce pergeremus lumine nobis congenito, nihil mali ex phantasiae vitiis aut aliis aut nobis cumularemus, utpote quam regere-

---

[1] Cf. Plato, *Meno*, esp. 81, for the doctrine of reminiscence.

[2] Cf. Gen. 8.21: 'For the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth.'

itself, but acquires all its knowledge and science from the senses through the medium of phantasy.

Both Aristotle himself and the theologians of Paris who followed him unanimously proclaimed this principle, although Plato, and some of the Peripatetics also, seem to have felt otherwise. Even if the opinion of the latter were supported by truth it would not weaken the case as set forth. The Platonists affirm that the soul descends, imprinted with ideas, into the body, yet they admit that the soul forgets these ideas,[1] and as a result, for reminiscence requires the help of sense and phantasy. But granted that imagination is necessary; nevertheless it is irrational and devoid of correct judgment, unless aided by the guidance of a superior power. Hearkening to this, imagination beatifies man; disobedient to it, imagination dooms him. For if phantasy shall deliberately resist the pleasures which allure the senses, and drag them to things infernal, and shall strive to draw them to things celestial, it will lead thither the rebellious sense, unwilling and reluctant though this be. But if, yielding to the senses, phantasy shall decline to apply itself to the business of virtue, so great is its power that it afflicts the body and beclouds the mind, and finally brings it about that man divests himself of humanity, and takes on bestiality. Therefore we can without difficulty affirm that not only all the good, universally, but also all the bad, can be derived from the imagination.

CHAPTER VII

On the numerous Evils which come from the Imagination

Since the life of men is slippery, and inclined to blundering and falling, and, as Holy Writ reminds us, is from youth prone to evil,[2] it may often be that what we ought to use for our happiness we abuse for our misery and unhappiness. Were we to proceed with the light native to us as our guide, we should accumulate no evil from the faults of phantasy, whether for others or for our-

mus rationis imperio, non sequeremur, compesceremus errantem, non praecipitem impelleremus. Qui enim phantasiae dominari contendit in ea persistit dignitate in qua creatus positusque est, a qua jugiter invitatur dirigendam esse mentis aciem in bonorum omnium parentem Deum, nec ab adoptione divina in quam adscitus est ullo pacto degenerandum. Qui autem incurvi sensus fallacisque imaginationis dicto paret, amissa protinus dignitate, in bruta degenerat. Comparatus, ut ait propheta, jumentis insipientibus et similis factus illis. Sed et deterior mihi atque vilior jumentis ipsis judicandus homo videtur, qui spreto divinae maiestatis ordine, sua ipse malitia obrutescit; ad hoc enim factus, eoque positus loco in ipso ordine universi, ut ad superna, ad Deum, conscendat, qui descendere mavult ad infima, et quae partes bestiarum sunt suae oblitus dignitatis obire. Illa quod bruta sunt, non ex culpa, sed ex propria forma obtinent. Homo autem quod brutum vita et moribus evadat, ex phantasia habet, quam sibi principem dominamque constituit; ex propria malitia habet tanto bestiis deterior, quanto divinae maiestatis ordinem destruit atque pervertit, in eam quae ad se uti ad finem proximum facta est naturam degenerans.

Jam neque difficile probatu est errata universa, quae tam in civili quam philosophica et Christiana vita contingunt, ex imaginationis vitio principia sumere. Civitatis pacem turbat ambitio, crudelitas, iracundia, avaritia, libido. Porro, ambitionis parens et alumna est imaginatio prava, quae praestare ceteris pulchrum ducit, nulla alioquin aut virtutis aut stemmatis habita ratione, quibus ii praefulgeant, quos praeire honoribus satagit qui pernicioso ambitu fervet. Crudelitatem, iram, atque iracundiam et parit et alit imaginatio ementiti boni atque fallacis,

---

[1] Vulg. Ps. 48.13.

[2] Cf. Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, part 1. sect. 2. mem. 3. subs. 2: 'Some ascribe all vices to a false and corrupt imagination, anger, revenge, lust, ambition, covetousness, which prefers falsehood before that which is right and good, deluding the soul with false shews and suppositions;' Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité* 3. 1: 'Les sens et l'imagination sont des sources fécondes et inépuisables d'égarements et d'illusions.'

selves, seeing that we should by sway of reason rule over phantasy, and not follow it; we should suppress phantasy, if it errs, and not urge it on, if it is hasty. He who strives to dominate phantasy persists in that dignity in which he was created and placed, and by which he is continually urged to direct the eye of the mind towards God, Father of all blessings, and in no way to debase himself from the divine adoption into which he has been admitted. But he who obeys the dictates of the perverted sense and deceitful imagination, at once loses his dignity, and degenerates to the brute. He hath been compared, as saith the Prophet, to senseless beasts, and made like to them.[1] And, in my opinion, even lower and viler than senseless beasts should that man be considered who, having spurned the order of divine majesty, through his own baseness himself becomes the brute; the man who, set in this place, in the very order of the Universe, and created to ascend to things sublime, to God, prefers to descend to the depths, and, forgetful of his own dignity, to enter into the realm allotted to the beasts. As for the beasts, it is not from any fault in them that they are brutes, but because of their proper form; while it is from his phantasy, which he has set up to be his princess and mistress, that man becomes a brute in life and character; and by reason of his own evil nature, he is so much the lower than the beasts as he destroys and perverts the order of divine majesty, degenerating into that bestial nature which was created to find in human nature its proximate end.

Nor is it hard to prove that universal errors[2] which occur as much in civil life as in the philosophic and Christian life, take their beginnings from the defect of the imagination. The peace of the State is disturbed by ambition, cruelty, wrath, avarice, and lust. But then the depraved imagination is the mother and nurse of ambition, and thinks it a fine thing to outstrip all others, albeit without regard for the virtue or nobility whereby those may shine whom the man fired by ruinous ambition busies himself to surpass in honors. Cruelty, wrath, and passion are born from and nourished by the imagination of an ostensible but

quod inesse vindictae arbitratur is qui fervido sensu et imaginatione praecipiti fertur in contumelias et vulnera et caedes. Et quid aliud inexstinguibilem auri sitim excitat? Quid libidinis ardorem incendit, et quae ob temporis brevitatem vitia reliqua mittimus in medium profert, quam deceptrix imaginatio? Quae, ratione posthabita, et injuriam justitiae, et libidinem continentiae, et mansuetudini feritatem, et liberalitati avaritiam, paci et discordiam anteponit.

Ceterum si ad philosophicae vitae functiones intuendas conversi fuerimus, nil minus incommodi videbimus ei a falsis imaginationibus provenisse. Et sane cogitanti mihi unde tam varia, tam multiplex opinionum dissensio derivaverit, quae a philosophis illis Thalete, Democrito, Empedocle, Zenone, Pythagora, reliquis ad nostra usque tempora defluxit, nihil rationabilius quam de fallaci imaginatione statuendum occurrit. Nam, ut quisque sensu et imaginatione propensus, ita eius de naturalibus moralibusque judicium est, nisi ratione moderetur. Hinc corporeae voluptati primas dabant, qui phantasia corrupta ferebantur. Hinc rerum principia atomi aquae existimabantur, et quae in philosophia cetera monstra visuntur et ortum hinc et incrementum accepere.

Animae namque cum eiusdem speciei naturaeve sint omnes, earumque intellectus et ratio abjuncta separataque suis in functionibus a corpore sint, tamquam perpetuum a corruptibili, ut in De Anima libro Aristoteles decernit, provenire opinionum fallacia ab eis non potest. Quod et Plato innuit in Phaedone, tametsi luminis innati, per quod veritas indicatur, intentio remissioque proveniat, juxta eorum sententiam qui perfectiores alias aliis animas immitti in corpora judicavere, secundum perfectiorem formati corporis ad eas suscipiendas aptitudinem. At hoc nihil ad diversitatem contrarietatemque opinionum facit, cum

[1] 430^a.

[2] Cf. 93 ff., esp. 94^c.

deceptive good, which one who is carried away by perfervid sense and rash imagination to insults, wounds, and murders, thinks inherent in retaliation. What else excites the insatiable thirst for gold? What else kindles the ardor of lust? And what else, if not the deceitful imagination, brings to the fore the other vices which for want of time I omit to mention? Neglecting reason, she gives precedence to injustice rather than to justice, to lust rather than to continence, to savagery rather than to clemency, to avarice rather than to generosity, to discord rather than to peace.

And if we turn our attention to the functions of the philosophic life, we shall see that no lesser disadvantage has accrued to it from false phantasies. Indeed, when I consider the source of the shifting, the manifold, differences in opinion that have come down even to our time from those great philosophers, Thales, Democritus, Empedocles, Zeno, Pythagoras, and the others, nothing strikes me as more reasonable than that we should pass sentence upon the treacherous imagination. For, as a man is disposed by sense and imagination, so is his judgment on natural and moral matters disposed, unless it be controlled by reason. Hence did those who were carried away by a corrupt phantasy give first importance to bodily pleasures. Hence, again, the first beginnings of things, the atoms, were thought to be water. Hence did the other vagaries which are seen in philosophy take their origin and growth.

Truly, since all souls are of the same form or nature, and since, as Aristotle in his book *De Anima*[1] resolves, their intellect and reason are in function disjoined and separate from the body, as the eternal from the corruptible, therefore from these souls false opinion cannot come. This Plato, too, intimates in the *Phaedo*,[2] as if there were produced a tension and relaxation of an innate light through which truth is revealed, in accord with the notion of those who judged that some souls more perfect than others were sent into bodies, following the more perfect fitness of the body formed to receive them. But this has nothing to do

operationes contrariae non ex intentione remissioneque, sed de contrariis principiis, formis, speciebusve prodeant. Verum cum phantasmatibus uti eas necesse sit, dum in corpore manserint, eaque tum recta, tum distorta, tum obscura, tum lucida, tum laeta, tum tristia, et in diversis hominibus, et in eisdem etiam pro causarum (de quibus mox dicturi sumus) varietate habeantur, fateri opus est monstrosarum opinionum omnium culpas et judicii defectus omnis phantasiae vitiis extra omnem aleam ascribendas. Et cum ex eo quod quisque sibi opinione sectandum delegit ducatur fere in agendo genus humanum, corrogare etiam facile possumus ea quae patrantur peccata de imaginationis vitio plurimum pullulare. Subinde quoque colligemus Christianam vitam, quae et in credendo et in operando consistit, ab imaginatione falsa labefactari.

Qua etenim ratione probavimus vanas philosophorum opiniones ab imaginationibus falsis prodiisse, eadem quoque statim concludimus, haereses ipsas, hoc est, perversas in Christiana fide opiniones, ortum inde accepisse. Cumque itidem deductum sit ex opinionibus falsis perversas fluere operationes, eo ipso etiam deducitur perversas Christianorum operationes ex opinionibus ipsis quae de imaginationibus pendent processisse.

Sed de his satis, quo etenim pacto et fallatur et varietur imaginatio, et quibus modis eius morbis afferre opem possimus, deinceps exsequendum.

[VIII]

Unde Imaginationum Varietas. Caput Octavum.

Ab his consequens est ut vestigemus quam ob rem falsae imaginationes in nobis fiant, et quid causae est, ut in diversis hominibus diversae, atque in eisdem etiam non conformes pro temporum varietate habeantur. Nam vel fieri nullo pacto, vel

with diversity and contrariety of opinions, since contrary operations follow, not from tension and relaxation, but from contrary principles, forms, or appearances. Still, since souls must employ phantasms while they remain in the body, and since these phantasms are now correct and now distorted, now obscure and now lucid, now joyful and now sad, in the same men as well as in different men, in accordance with a variety of causes (about which we shall soon speak); therefore we must confess that the faults of all monstrous opinions, and the defects of all judgment, are to be ascribed beyond all peradventure to the vices of phantasy. And since human kind in action are generally influenced by what each, through exercise of opinion, has elected to follow, we can also easily gather that such sins as are committed mostly spring from the fault of the imagination. We shall further deduce that the Christian life, which consists in both belief and action, is ruined by a false imagination.

As, then, we have proved that the vain opinions of philosophers have come from false phantasies, so also we immediately conclude that the very heresies, that is, perverse opinions in Christian faith, have arisen from this source. And since it has been shown that perverse deeds spring from false opinions, by the same reasoning we further conclude that the perverse deeds of Christians have followed from precisely the opinions which rely on phantasies.

But so much for this, since now I must in turn take up the way in which imagination is deceived and altered, and the means by which we can bring help to its disorders.

CHAPTER VIII

Whence the Variety of Phantasies

From the foregoing it logically follows that we should determine why false phantasies arise in us, and what it is that causes different phantasies to be experienced in different men, and dissimilar phantasies in accordance with the variety of conditions even for the same men. It will in no way be possible, or at least

certe difficulter poterit, ut ad veritatis normam vitia et defectus imaginationis corrigamus, nisi eorum causas, quae removeri scilicet oporteat, medicorum rationalium more perquisitas exploratasque habuerimus. Diximus ante opinionum varietatem eiusque culpas atque rationalis animae defectus omnis ab ipsa ratione et intellectu (qua scilicet intellectus et ratio est) provenire non posse, sed ab imaginationis vitio derivari. Cur autem varietur fallaturque imaginatio, quibusque modis errata ipsius ad veri orbitam dirigenda sunt, nondum exprompsimus.

Imaginationum itaque varietas—praeter Deum, rerum omnium causam—ab ipsa corporis temperatura, a rebus sensu perceptis quibus afficimur, ab arbitrio nostro, a bonorum malorumque angelorum ministerio dependet.

Primum primitus exsequamur. Quem ad modum sanguine, pituita, bile rubra aut atra abundat quispiam, sic et eius imaginatio philosophorum medicorumque testimonio huius modi naturam sectatur, ut pro eorum diversitate ad diversas imagines—hilares, torpidas, truculentas, maestas—exstimuletur, a quibus non secus intellectus, spiritalis animae oculus, in cognoscendo variat atque decipitur ac corporeus depictis variegatisque specillis hallucinatur. Utitur namquam illis corpori junctus ad veritatem contemplandam, veluti hebeti visu oculus specillis vitreis ad rem sensilem intuendam, eoque pacto quo et oculus ipse decipitur. Si enim vitrea specilla diversis in locis ponantur, per quae ipsi oculo rei cuiuspiam imago monstretur, quamquam ea suapte natura una est, unicamque sui similitudinem proferre debet, pro speculorum tamen aut distortorum aut infectorum varietate, varias sui imagines in oculum imprimit, utpote quae aliter a cava superficie, aliter a convexa, aliter a caeruleo dehonestata, aliter a nigro deturpata reddatur. Ita et intellectui evenit quod, ei veritas ipsa quamquam suapte natura una est pura atque impermixta, ob

---

[1] *Specillis*. Several lines below appears the word *speculorum*, evidently with the same meaning. *C. L. specillum* = surgical probe; *speculum* = mirror.

[2] See preceding note.

with great difficulty will it be possible, for us to correct the vices and defects of the imagination to the norm of truth, unless, like rational physicians, we have thoroughly probed and examined their causes, which clearly must be removed. I have said above that the variety of opinions, the faults of opinion, and all the defects of the rational soul, cannot come from reason itself and the intellect (wherever, be it understood, intellect and reason exist), but proceed from the defect of the imagination. I have not yet, however, disclosed why phantasy is altered and deceived, and in what ways its wanderings should be directed into the path of truth.

Accordingly, the variety of imaginations depends—apart from the Cause of all things, God—on the very temperament of the body, on the objects perceived by sense that affect us, on our judgment, and on the ministration of the good and bad angels.

Let us begin at the very beginning. It is the testimony of philosophers and medical men that one's imagination is determined by the relative supply of blood, phlegm, red bile, or black bile. Thus, in correspondence with the diversity of humors, one's imagination is stimulated to diverse images: cheerful, dull, grim, sad. Influenced by these humors in the act of cognizing, the spiritual eye of the soul, the intellect, changes and is deceived, just as the bodily eye experiences illusions through tinted, parti-colored lenses.[1] The spiritual eye, joined to the body, makes use of images to contemplate truth, as the eye of dull vision uses glass lenses[1] to gaze at a sensible object; and it is deceived exactly as is the bodily eye itself. If glass lenses[1] are set in various positions, and through them an image of some object is shown to the bodily eye, although the object is of one and its own nature, and should produce a single likeness of itself, still, according to the variety of glasses[2] either distorted or spoiled, the object imprints on the eye various images of itself, being rendered in one way by a concave surface, in another by a convex, in one way marred by blue, in another disfigured by black. Precisely such is the case with the intellect also. Although to the intellect truth itself is of one and its own nature, pure and unmixed, yet,

diversa tamen contrariaque phantasmata multiplex, infecta, permixtaque praesentetur. Qui autem vel temperatura corporis, vel arte et exercitio, vel speciali divinae largitatis privilegio, puriora simplicioraque phantasmata adepti sunt, ii ad percipiendam rerum veritatem aptiores procul dubio sunt. Huc tendere illud de Sapientiae libro potest: Sortitus sum animam bonam, et illud Aristotelis in libro De Anima: Molles carne apti sunt mente. Sed et Cicero in libro De Natura Deorum secundo declarat quibusdam regionibus atque urbibus contingere ut hebetiora sint hominum ingenia propter caeli pleniorem naturam; et alibi, quod Athenis tenue caelum, ob idque eas praeclarorum ingeniorum altrices esse.

Variae itaque imagines atque eaedem saepenumero falsae de vario corporis temperamento manant; quod a parentibus, a patria, a victus ratione nanciscimur, uti a causis proximis particularibusque quibus effectus speciem sortiuntur. Etenim filii eo usque parentibus similes evadunt, ut si quispiam prorsus dissimilis reperiatur, Aristoteles in libris De Animalium Generatione monstris eum connumerandum censeat. Regionibus quoque aliis alias inesse corporum temperaturas conspicimus, quae de ratione victus etiamnum immutantur; videmus enim procera, succulenta, vivida Gallorum et Germanorum corpora, Hispanorum pusilla atque retorrida, Maurorum nigra atque decocta. In eadem quoque regione eundem hominem videmus ob exercitia, ob selectos cibos, aliaque eius modi, de macilento pinguem factum, de tristi hilarem, de somniculoso vigilem; contraque de pingui, hilari, vigili, macilentum, tristem, atque torpentem. Hae proximae et particulares causae. Caelum autem universalis et remota dumtaxat, non autem particularis, ut fabulantur astrologi, quorum

[1] 8.19.

[2] 421^a.

[3] 2.6.

[4] Cf. *De Fato* 4.

[5] 767^b ff.

on account of diverse and contrary phantasms, truth appears manifold, corrupted, and mixed. Moreover, those men are doubtless more fitted to perceive the verity of things, who, whether through bodily temperament, or through skill and practice, or by the special privilege of divine bounty, have obtained purer and simpler phantasms. Here may be applied that passage from the Book of Wisdom: 'I had a good spirit,'[1] and that from Aristotle's treatise *De Anima:* 'The soft-skinned are the able-minded.'[2] Cicero, too, in the second book of his *De Natura Deorum*,[3] says it is characteristic of certain districts and cities that the capacities of men are naturally duller there, from the denser quality of the atmosphere. Elsewhere he says that Athens is the nurse of remarkable geniuses, for the reason that the atmosphere is rarefied.[4]

Thus, various images, and often false ones, arise from the varying disposition of the body, which we obtain from our parents, from our native land, and from our manner of living, since these are the proximate and the particular causes by which tendencies gain form. Indeed, sons become so like to their parents that, if any be found obviously unlike, Aristotle (in his books *De Animalium Generatione*)[5] would decide that such ought to be numbered with monstrosities. We observe that some bodily dispositions are inherent in some districts, some in others, and that these temperaments, moreover, are not changed by manner of life; for we see the tall, vigorous, lively bodies of the French and Germans, the slight and wizened bodies of the Spanish, the black and wasted bodies of the Moors. We see even in the same region the same man through exercise and careful diet, and other precautions of this sort, from lean made fat; from sad, gay; from sleepy, active; and *vice versa* from fat, happy, and wide-awake, made spare, gloomy, and sluggish. These are the proximate and particular causes. Climate, however, is a universal and remote cause, not, as the astrologers say, a particular. There is no reason why I should spend more effort in refuting and rejecting

insania, quia satis abunde a Johanne Pico, patruo meo, duodecim libris explosa est, non est cur in ea confutanda reiciendaque plus operae insumam.

Ab rebus item extrinsecus occursantibus quibus afficimur, varias oriri easdemque falsas imaginationes in nobis hinc liquido constat, quod objecta sensus identidem mutant varieque afficiunt. Cum enim imaginatio sequatur sensum ducaturque ab eo, consentaneum est ut et variato sensu varietur imaginatio, eoque labente, et ipsa labatur. Sensus autem propriorum sensilium, quamquam aut semper verus aut rarissime falsus, in iis tamen quae subjecta sunt ipsis sensilibus, hoc est, quibus accidunt ipsa sensibilia, fallitur saepenumero. Nam tametsi eum qui accedit hominem recte affirmare possumus aut nigrum aut candidum, vel Jacobum autem vel Johannem si etiam affirmaverimus, facillime decipi et errare poterimus. In communibus quoque sensilibus, id est, in eis quae adnexa propriis agnataque sunt, magnitudine, figura, numero, motu, saepissime fallimur. Hinc solis magnitudinem bicubitam existimat imaginatio. Hinc brevissimo spatio delineatam vel hominis vel equi similitudinem, magna intercapedine contineri pronuntiat. Hinc plures sub unica imagine numeros hallucinatur. Hinc quiescere quae etiam moveantur res, contraque moveri quae sedentaria quiete torpent, comminiscitur. In universum praeterea fallitur, cum de eo quod ad plures attinet sensus, uno dumtaxat in judicium citato, sententiam promit.

Ab arbitrio etiam nostro pendere imaginationes ipsas Aristoteles tertio ad Nicomachum libro auctor est.

Boni item et mali angeli bona et mala formare in nobis phantasmata possunt. A bonis enim magna verae prophetiae pars pendet; nam quamquam in intellectum influit quandoque Deus quasique insculpit futurorum notas; quamvis item rerum imagines

---

[1] *Disputationes adversus Astrologos*, *Opera Novissima Accurate Revisa*, Strassburg, 1504, fol. cxv–ccxvi; *Opera Omnia*, Basel, 1572, 1.411–733. This work was first published at Bologna (B. Hectoris), July 16, 1495, in fol. Lucio Bellanti wrote his *De astrologica veritate Quaestiones, et Astrologiae Defensio contra Picum* to refute the arguments of Giovanni Pico. See Niceron, *Mémoires* 34.144; Tiraboschi, *Bibl. Mod.* 4.106; W. P. Greswell, *Memoirs*, Manchester, 1805, p. 346.

their foolish argument, since it has been quite conclusively exploded by my paternal uncle, Giovanni Pico, in twelve books.[1]

Again, that varied and false phantasies arise in us from objects appearing from without and affecting us is fully evident from the fact that objects often change and variously affect the senses; for, since imagination follows sense and is guided by it, necessarily when sense is varied, imagination is varied, and when sense fails, imagination fails. Though always true or subject to the minimum of error, the perception of special sensibles is frequently deceived in the things accessory to the sensibles themselves, that is, in those things of which the special sensibles are attributes. For example, while we can correctly assert that the man who is approaching is black or white, if we declare positively that he is James or John, we shall very likely err and be deceived.[2] In common sensibles also, in those qualities, that is, which are connected with the special sensibles, and belong to them—magnitude, form, number, motion—we are not seldom mistaken. Thus the imagination reckons the magnitude of the sun as two cubits; thus it affirms that the likeness of either a man or a horse, depicted on a very small scale, really fills a large space; thus in a single image it dreams it sees a great number; thus it contrives that things actually in motion seem motionless, and on the other hand that those things seem to be in motion which lie inactive and fixed. Further, the imagination is generally deceived when, on the evidence of but one sense, it passes judgment upon an object which is the concern of more than one.

That the phantasies are also dependent upon our will, we have on the authority of Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 3.[3]

Finally, good and bad angels can form in us good and bad phantasms. On the good phantasms, indeed, depends a large part of true prophecy. Prophecy flows into the intellect, whenever God, as it were, engraves therein the signs of the future.

Pico's work has been regarded as the first to expose the fallacies of astrology. See Greswell, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

[2] For the source of Pico's material in this section, see Aristotle, *De Anima* 418^a; 425^a; 428^b ff., and cf. Hicks, *op. cit.*, pp. 468–9, note on 428^b17.

[3] 1114^b.

forinsecus oculis ostendantur, quibus aspectis quid portendatur affulgente divino lumine prophetae dijudicent; nihilominus sacras litteras revolventibus nobis pauca se offerunt eius modi prophetis ostensa divinitus, comparatione eorum quae visione phantastica patefacta sunt. Nam—ut mittam prophetae Amos et Zachariae aliorumque veterum libros, qui toti visis imaginariis scatent—ipsa Apocalypsis Johannis imaginaria est, quae totius ecclesiae decursum ad usque damnatorum poenas et beatorum gloriam amplectitur; et a Luca in Actibus Apostolorum visiones imaginariae nonnullae describuntur.

A malis item angelis pseudo-prophetae fiunt, qui pro veris falsa venditant, et vera interdum nonnulla ferunt, ut vendibiliori superstitione amentium animos irretiant; illuduntque in phantasmatis virorum, feminarumque quas striges vocant, quorum sensus perniciosissime perstringunt. Sed et praeter futurorum imagines, praesentium etiam, et ad vitae obeunda munera conducentium, a bonis angelis in nobis afformantur; a malis itidem, sed malae aut semper aut saepe. Qui si quandoque suadere bona videantur, id versutissimo astu peragunt, quo, si fides eis habeatur, facilius postea ludificent truculentiusque insidientur.[a]

Et de his hactenus; nunc ad alia transmeandum.

[IX]

Quo modo Imaginationis Morbus Falsitasque de Corporis Temperatura deque Objectis Sensuum proveniens corrigi curarique possit. Caput IX.

Vidimus causas ob quas et variat et fallit imaginatio; nunc quo pacto vitiis eius resistendum est morbisque medendum pro virili explicemus. Quod ut commodo exsequamur, hinc sumere

[a] insidentur VS.

---

[1] A consequence of the Platonic doctrine of dæmonic influence. Cf. the views of Maimonides on false prophecy and imagination, Bundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 213 ff.; and St. Thomas Aquinas on good and bad angels, Bundy, pp. 221 ff.

And again, by the splendor of heavenly light, the prophets discern portents from contemplating the images of things presented to their eyes from without; yet, when we turn the pages of Holy Writ, we find but few things thus divinely revealed to the prophets in comparison with those disclosed to them by imaginative vision. For—to pass over the books of Amos, Zechariah, and other ancient prophets, all abounding in imaginative visions—the Apocalypse of John is imaginative, including the career of the whole Church, even to the punishments of the damned and the glory of the blessed; and many imaginative visions are described by Luke in the Acts of the Apostles.

By bad angels, again, false prophets are made,[1] prophets who are wont to offer the false for sale instead of the true, who occasionally utter some truths so that by more vendible superstition they may ensnare the minds of the foolish. They run riot in the phantasies of men, and of women called witches, and most ruinously seize upon their senses. Still more than images of future things, the good angels form in us images of things present, and images of things which lead to the discharge of the duties of life. The same power is possessed by the bad angels, but the images are either always or often bad. If these angels should seem at any time to advise good, they do so with the shrewdest cunning, so that, if trust be placed in them, they may afterward the more easily delude, and the more cruelly entrap us.

But so much for these considerations. Now we must pass to others.

CHAPTER IX

How the Disorder of the Imagination, and the Falsity originating in the Temperament of the Body and the Objects of the Senses, can be corrected and cured

We have seen the reasons why imagination varies and deceives. Now let me to the best of my ability explain how its vices are to be withstood, and its disorders cured. Seasonably to pursue this

liceat exordium. Phantasiae morbi atque vitia quae ob temperaturam contingunt, de siccitate nimia, humiditate, caliditate, frigoreque eius organi, vel simplicibus vel compositis, proveniunt, a quibus veluti seminariis cuncta fere imaginationum fallacia pullulat. Hinc fit, ut labilis nimio plus fiat fluatque identidem imaginatio, nec conceptas rerum effigies retentet. Illinc, ut plusquam opus sit figatur, enixeque adeo in vestigio haereat, ut ex uno in aliud simulacrum aegre demigrare possit; quas ob res errores multi visuntur, tam ex organi repugnantia, quod aut debitas metas transilit in negotio, aut moras nimias trahit in otio,[a] cum negotio sit opus, quam quod ex diversa humorum mixtione, modo impense tristis, modo hilaris plus aequo, modo acer impendio, modo torpens nimium homo redditur. Horum causa in temperaturam referenda est, in qua, ut primas simplicesve omittam qualitates, aut sanguis, aut pituita, aut rubra aut atra bilis exsuperet. Sed et ipsi quoque imaginandi usui accepta referri potest, qui de subjectis sensuum rebus, quae appellamus objecta, proficiscitur. Id efficitur, cum ex rei cuiuspiam affectu, illius spectrum similacrumve, objectis abdicatisque ceteris, conatu magno complectimur; et dum pluribus intentus animus curiositate nimia modo unam, modo aliam imaginem, idque crebro et impetuose, pertractat.

Qui de corporis temperatura manant morbi corporeis rebus curandi, et morbi ipsius naturae contrariis, ut sicca nimium temperatura in humidam, atque impense humida in siccam, frigidaque in calidam, et in frigidam calida eatenus inclinet, quatenus ad aequalitatem debitam medicorum et consilio et ope reducantur. Qui vero de usu affectibusque proveniunt, contrariis item usibus affectibusque curandi. Si enim in rei cuiuspiam imaginem pro-

---

[a] monitio VS; corrected in S by Pico in table of *errata*.

subject, let me make my introduction from the following point. The diseases and imperfections of phantasy which hinge upon temperament arise from the excessive dryness, humidity, heat, or cold, each individually, or all together, of its organ. From these nurseries, as it were, emerges almost all the deception of phantasies. Hence it is, on the one hand, that the imagination becomes too prone to slip, and is ever and again in flux, and does not retain the appearances of things as conceived. Hence it is, on the other hand, that the imagination is more fixed than is necessary, and holds so fast to the same spot that only with difficulty can it pass from one likeness to another. Therefore many errors are to be remarked arising as much from the resistance of the organ (which either in action leaps over the proper bounds, or at rest drags out an excessive delay when action is needed) as from the fact that, owing to the diverse mixture of humors, man is rendered now exceedingly gloomy, now happier than is proper, now very keen, now too dull. The cause of these phenomena must be referred to temperament, in which, to pass over the first and simple qualities, either blood, or phlegm, or red bile, or black, predominates; but the cause can also be credited to the functioning of imagination, as it has its starting-point in the things, which we call objects, that are subject to the senses. This is the case when, from a desire for any one thing, we with great endeavor embrace its form or likeness, rejecting all others presented; and when the mind, intent on many images, with excessive curiosity handles now one, now another, and this frequently and impetuously.

The disorders which arise from the temperament of the body are to be cured by bodily things, and diseases of nature itself by their contraries, in order that the excessively dry temperament may so far incline to the humid and the exceedingly humid to the dry, the cold to the hot and the hot to the cold, as to be reduced by the wisdom and resource of physicians to a proper equilibrium. The diseases which proceed from function and affection are likewise to be treated with contrary function and affection. If, for

pensius quam deceat feramur, abstrahere inde cogitatum quantum possumus debemus, atque alio flectere, siquidem evenit interdum ut ex imaginatione plus aequo intenta, eiusque usu impendio frequenti, syncopim nonnulli perpessi sint, et ad insaniam etiam perducti; idque eis periculosum valde qui contemplativae addicti vitae imaginationi habenas laxant. Quibus Johannes Gerson prudentissimus theologus plurifariam consulit in eis libris quos inscripsit De Mystica Theologia, et in eo cui titulum fecit De Passionibus Animae, et alibi etiam multa in exemplum revocans, atque inter alia quempiam citans, qui ad solum eius libri aspectum qui Climax Graece dicitur labebatur in syncopim, ob frequentem nimio plus rerum earum imaginationem quae in eo perscriptae sunt. Si vero mobilis multum et fluxa nimium imaginatio fuerit, quaerenda nobis erit unica imago vel paucae circa quas versemur, ut a tumultu illo atque concursu specierum vario quiescamus. Pari pacto, si nimis tristis quispiam, ad hilaritatem, si hilaris nimium, ad tristitiam ut vergat curare debet; si torpeat, conari ut excitetur, si excitatus plusquam decet, residere.

Quae autem res illae et imagines, quae unicuique ad istius modi obeunda conducant, quoniam decernere difficillimum, quisque sibi eas aut ex aliis deligat, aut ex se promat; modo ad bene beateque vivendum faciant. Nobis duae olim visae, quarum una ad amorem, ad timorem altera excitaremur, quae tribus libris explicavimus, quos De Morte Christi et Propria Cogitanda inscripsimus. Atqui neque malarum dumtaxat, sed et omnium imaginationum multitudinem fugiendam Proclus Platonicus censuit, ob id quod falleret impense atque distraheret. Quod equidem recte statutum arbitror, nisi dum pro remedio ad eas quispiam confu-

---

[1] *Opera Omnia*, Antwerp, 1706, 3.361–422, esp. *Consideratio* XII (pp. 420–2).

[2] *Opera Omnia* 3.123–5; 127–46, esp. *Consideratio* XX (pp. 142–3).

[3] Presumably, the *Scala Paradisi* of John Climacus, Migne, *Pat. Gr.* 88. 581 ff. I have been unable to find in Gerson the reference to this incident.

[4] See particularly 2.1. This work, which is included in the Strassburg collection of 1506–7, was first published at Bologna (B. Hectoris), July 20, 1497, in 4°. It was dedicated to Savonarola in a preface inscribed at Mirandola on Oct. 20, 1496.

[5] *In Platonis Alcibiadem Priorem Commentarii* πβ, ed. F. Creuzer, Frankfort on Main, 1820, pp. 245–6.

instance, we should be drawn to an image of any thing more readily than is seemly, we should, as far as we can, withdraw from thinking about it, and turn to something else, since it occasionally has happened that from imagination more than properly intent, and from its too frequent functioning, many have suffered fainting-spells, and even been driven to insanity. And this is very perilous to those devoted to the contemplative life, who give free rein to the imagination. To them Jean Gerson, a most prudent theologian, gives counsel in many places in the books he has entitled *De Mystica Theologia*,[1] and in the book to which he has given the name *De Passionibus Animae*,[2] and elsewhere too, recalling many examples. Among other instances, he cites a certain person who at the mere sight of the book called in Greek *Climax*,[3] fell into a trance because of the much too frequent imagining of the things therein described. If the imagination is too mobile and loose, we must seek a single image, or a few on which to dwell, in order to be at ease from that tumult and varying concourse of impressions. Similarly, if any one is too sad, he should strive to turn to joy; if too joyful, to sadness. If he is sluggish, he should try to grow excited; if more than properly excited, to become calm.

Inasmuch, however, as it is very difficult to decide which are those things and images that in the individual case conduce to experiences of this sort, every one should either choose them for himself from other sources, or produce them of himself; only let them lead to good and blessed living. Previously these things and images had appeared to me to be two, through one of which we were to be excited to love, through the other to fear—as I have made plain in three books which I have entitled *De Morte Christi et Propria Cogitanda*.[4] None the less, the Platonist Proclus believed that the multitude of all phantasies, not only of the bad, was to be avoided, on the ground that they caused great deception and perplexity.[5] For my part, I think this a correct judgment, with the proviso that a person who had long and

geret, qui diu enixeque solius cuiusdam imaginis compedes pertulisset. Ceterum specilla ea, cum distorta, tum infecta, de quibus superiori capite actum a nobis, in universum deponenda sunt, et recta atque perspicua desumenda; hoc est, nimiarum malarumque affectionum habitus exuendi, bonarumque et paucarum induendi, de illis enim imaginatio falsa progreditur, quae rectum alioquin judicium infirmat et torquet. Hoc autem in nostra facultate positum est, sicuti et victus ratio et exercitia, quorum ope imaginationum morbis mederi possumus quae aut a parentibus aut a propria malitia contraximus. Conari item debemus ut sensum tantisper sequatur imaginatio dum circa propria sensilia munus obit suum, nam tum vera incorruptaque est; dum vero de subjectis communibusque arbitratur, refugiat, quippe quae tam adjuncto quam abjuncto sensu oberrabit. Nam si sensus adjunctus coespitaverit, necessario et imaginatio collabetur. Facilius quoque et impensius eo corruet abjuncto et sequestrato sensu, qui rerum vestigia in ipsa imaginatione minus integre conservabuntur; quod tum continget maxime, cum sensibilium generum species ad oculum de longinquo deferentur.

[X]

Quo pacto eis Imaginationis Malis, quae a nostro pendent Arbitrio, Rationis usu succurrendum. Caput Decimum.

Eis vero imaginationis morbis quae a nostro pendent arbitrio, quamquam et remedia ea quae supra recensuimus afferre opem possunt, ratio tamen ipsa medetur, cuius usu non solum ab istius modi, sed ab omni prorsus imaginationis injuria liberamur. Et licet hoc ipsum multis nec difficulter probare possemus, paucis tamen contenti erimus. Cuique enim notum, qui brutum penitus

strenuously endured the bonds of one and the same image might have recourse to many images for a remedy. But those distorted and corrupted lenses I have treated in a previous chapter must generally be laid aside, and correct and clear ones selected. In other words, the habiliments of the excessive and bad affections are to be stripped off, those of the good and few assumed; for from the former proceeds false imagination, which weakens and distorts a judgment otherwise sound. This act, moreover, has been placed in our power precisely as our mode of living has been, and those exercises by the aid of which we can cure the diseases of phantasies contracted either from our parents or from our own evil nature. We should try to make imagination follow sense just as long as the imagination has to do with special sensibles, for then it is true and sound; but should make it flee from sense whenever the imagination is passing judgment on associated and common properties, since obviously it will err as much when conjoined with sense as when disjoined from it; for if sense joined to it falls to earth, so, necessarily, will imagination collapse. If sense is separated and removed from it, even the more readily and surely will the imagination break down as the traces of things are the less perfectly retained in that imagination. This will especially be the case when the impressions of the sensible kinds of objects are conveyed to the eye from afar.

CHAPTER X

How we can relieve these Voluntary Evils of the Imagination by the use of Reason

Although the remedies we have noted above can also bring relief to such diseases of the imagination as are dependent on our will, still reason itself is a cure. By using it we are freed not only from this sort of injury, but from every injury whatsoever of the imagination. We can easily prove this in many ways, but shall be content with a few demonstrations. For example, every one

aut stupida planta non sit, rationem homini sectandam, sensus et phantasiae illecebras respuendas. Non omnibus tamen, immo perpaucis, exploratum quam multa ascribantur indigna humano generi, quae pro confesso irrationales, ut sic dixerim, homines concipiant; alioquin ut falsa a bene instituto animo eliminanda et in fallacem imaginationem jure optimo referenda. Voluptates enim multae, dolores plurimi, qui juxta Platonis dogmata simplices praecipuique affectus sunt, a quibus veluti elementis ceteri componuntur, cotidie excitantur in nobis imaginationis vitio; cum tamen de penitissimis rationis penetralibus proficisci videantur iis qui phantasiam identidem, rationem quam rarissime consulunt. Sumamus de aliquibus exempla.

Aut omnibus aut plerisque malum videtur mors—nec solum rudibus, sed et iis qui se litterarum gnaros profitentur. Illi enim atrocem eam imaginantur; hi, praeter id, etiam expavescunt ad Aristotelis vocem eam ultimum terribilium in Ethicis nuncupantem. Si tamen Epicteto philosopho Stoico crediderimus, mors ipsa nihil terribile est. Si Ambrosio Christiano theologo audierimus, tantum aberit ut terribilis judicetur, ut etiam expetenda proponatur, quippe qui librum composuerit quem De Bono Mortis inscripserit. Si rationem consulamus, ob id terribilem existimatam mortem inveniemus, quod opinio de morte terribilis est, quam phantasia peperit. Qui enim (ut ita loquar) ad ipsum esse compositi dumtaxat respicit, quod recedit, torminaque et cruciatus, qui praeire eam consueverunt, quique eam sequi solent, imaginatur, fieri minime potest ut non aliquatenus com-

---

[1] *Philebus*, esp. 39 ff. Pico here appears to be largely dependent on Alcinous, *De Doctrina Platonis*, chap. 31: 'For all affections exist according to the image of a good or an evil. . . . For there are two affections, simple and elementary, to wit, pleasure and pain, and from these the rest are formed;' cf. the Oxford (Lichfield) ed., 1667, p. 72.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* 1115^{a}: 'But nothing is so fearful as death; for death is the end, and when a man is dead, nothing can be either good or evil to him.'

[3] *Encheiridion* 5: 'Men are not disturbed by the things that happen, but by the opinions about the things. For instance, death is nothing terrible, for if it were, Socrates would have thought it so. The terrible thing is the opinion of death, that it is terrible.'

[4] 403^{b}: 'Although death is considered terrible by the living, it is not death for itself that is terrible, but the opinion about death, which every one interprets

who is not entirely a brute or a senseless plant well knows that man ought to follow reason, and ought to shake off the allurements of sense and phantasy. Nevertheless, not all, in fact very few, have discovered how many unworthy conceptions are ascribed to mankind in general which are to be attributed to the class of confessedly irrational men, as I would call them; conceptions which, moreover, should be eliminated from the well-regulated mind as false, and which with the greatest propriety may be charged to the deceitful imagination. Many pleasures, and very many pains, that according to the Platonic teachings are simple and primary affections, elements, as it were, from which the other affections are composed, are daily excited in us through the fault of the imagination.[1] And yet in the eyes of those who frequently consult phantasy, and as rarely as possible consult reason, the affections seem to start from the innermost recesses of reason. Let us consider examples from several sources.

To all, or at least to very many, death seems an evil—and not only to the ignorant, but even to those who profess to be conversant with literature. The ignorant imagine it to be dreadful; the learned, besides that, are further alarmed at the voice of Aristotle, in the *Ethics*, terming it the extreme of things terrible.[2] On the other hand, if we trust the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, death itself is nothing terrible.[3] And if we hearken to the Christian theologian Ambrose, it will be found that death, so far from being considered terrible, is actually set forth as a thing to be sought; in fact, he composed a book which he entitled *De Bono Mortis*.[4] If we consult reason, we shall discover that death has been considered terrible because the *opinion* of death, an opinion begot of the phantasy, is terrible. He who observes merely that to vanish is the very nature of the composite, so to speak, and who imagines the torments[5] and tortures which have

according to his own feeling or shudders at according to his conscience. . . . It is not hard to die, but hard to live under the fear of death;' 403^{c}: 'The foolish dread death as if it were the greatest of all evils; the wise seek it as being a rest after their labors and an end of their troubles;' 404^{c}: 'Death then is the fulness of tribute, the height of reward, the grace of release.' See *C.S.E.L.*, ed. C. Schenkl, 32 (*pars* 1, 1897). 730, 731, 734.

[5] C. L. *tormina* = *cramps*.

moveatur, non tristetur, non doleat. At qui ratiocinatur quod mors nihil aliud est quam separatio animae et corporis; quod absolvitur anima; quod resolvitur corpus; quod quae absolvitur gaudet, si bene in vita egerit; quod id quod resolvitur nihil sentit, nihil agnoscit, ad futurae mortis conceptum non horrescet. Ad haec, qui percipit mortem ipsam et Dei decreto et imbecillitate naturae, quam peccatum infecit, necessariam fore, nihil tristabitur, nihil angetur, frustra enim ratio de re necessaria tristatur.

Sed et pro eo quod nos mori dicimus τελευτεῖν Graeci ponunt, laborum quippe finis est mors, molestiarum finis, et melioris vitae principium. Namque, ut non minus vere quam et docte et eleganter capite quinto libri sui De Uno Et Ente Johannes Picus patruus scribit: incipimus tunc mori, cum primum incipimus vivere, et: mors cum vita protenditur, tuncque primum desinimus mori, cum a corpore mortis huius per carnis mortem absolvimur. Ab hac morte, Dei gratia, se liberandum dicebat Apostolus, et dissolvi optabat, et esse cum Christo, ratione utens, imaginationem posthabens, quam etiam philosophorum plurimi superaverunt sola consideratione calamitatis humanae speque melioris vivendae vitae. Ea enim quamquam vane freti et alacriter hac vita excedebant, et cunctantem mortem sibi consciscebant, aliosque ad id ipsum faciendum hortabantur, sicuti et Cleombrotus Ambraciotes et Hegesias aliique permulti. In hoc

---

[1] Ionic form for τελευτᾶν.

[2] *Opera Novissime Accurate Revisa*, Strassburg (?), 1504, chap. 5, fol. 64; *Opera Omnia*, Basel, 1572, 1.247. Giovanni Pico wrote this work at the request of Politian, completing it in 1491; see C. Meiners, *Lebensbeschreibungen berühmter Männer*, Zurich, 1796, 2-52–3, and W. P. Greswell, *op. cit.*, pp. 302 ff. The friendly controversy over it with Antonio Cittadini da Faenza extended through a frequent interchange of correspondence until Giovanni's death (November 17, 1494), after which Gianfrancesco came to the defense of his uncle's position. The nephew's *Defensio de Ente et Uno*, a brief letter by Antonio in reply (dated December 16, 1495), and an answer by Gianfrancesco (dated January 4, 1496) appear in the Strassburg collection of Gianfrancesco's works. Although Rigg, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola*, London, 1890, Introd., p. xiii, says that Giovanni published this essay in 1491, apparently the earliest traceable edition is that which appears in the collection of his works published March 20, 1496, Bologna, Benedictus Hectoris. See Hain, N°. 12992.

[3] Phil. 1.21 ff.

[4] After reading the *Phaedo*, he drowned himself in the sea in order to arrive sooner at the better life which the dialogue made known. Cf. Cicero, *Tusc.*

been wont to precede death and are wont to follow it, cannot but be somewhat moved and saddened and grieved. But he who reflects that death is nothing but a separation of soul and body; that the soul is set free; the body destroyed; that the soul in being set free, rejoices if it has done well in life; and that the body, in being destroyed, feels nothing, understands nothing; he who so reflects will not shudder at the future prospect of death. Further, he who perceives death itself to be inevitable, both by God's decree and through the weakness of nature corrupted by sin, will be in no way sad, and in no way troubled, for in vain does reason bewail the inevitable.

For what we call 'dying', the Greeks use the term τελευτεῖν,[1] 'coming to an end,' on the ground that death is an end to labors, an end to troubles, and the beginning of a better life. As my paternal uncle Giovanni Pico writes, not less truly than learnedly and charmingly (in the fifth chapter of his book *De Ente et Uno*): 'We begin to die at the time when first we begin to live'; and 'death is coextensive with life, and then first do we cease to die when we are freed from the substance of this death through the death of the flesh.'[2] When the Apostle said that he ought to be freed, by grace of God, from this death, and prayed to be released and to be with Christ,[3] he used reason, and disregarded imagination. Numerous philosophers also have risen above imagination solely through contemplating human disaster, and through the hope of a better life yet to be lived. Although their reliance on a better life was vain, philosophers like Cleombrotus[4] of Ambracia, and Hegesias,[5] and innumerable others, in order to hasten a death which had been slow in coming, departed from this life by suicide, and encouraged others to the same deed.

1.34; St. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* 1.22; Callimachus, *Epigrams* 25. Some have identified him with the Cleombrotus mentioned in *Phaedo* 59^{c}.

[5] The Cyrenaic philosopher (*c.* 300 B.C.) who maintained that, since happiness is impossible, death should be welcomed. Ptolemy I compelled him to close his school of 'Hegesiacs' at Alexandria because so many of his disciples were induced to commit suicide. Cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.34, Diogenes Laertius 2.93, *s. Aristippus*, and particularly J. C. Murray, *An Ancient Pessimist*, in *The Philosophical Review* 2 (1893) .24 ff.

laudandi solum, quod animae immortalitati accedebant, quod feliciorem vitam aeternamque paratam hominibus existimabant. In hoc damnandi, quod sibi vim inferebant, quod ea non procurabant sibi justis operibus, quibus aeterna felicitas comparatur, similitudine quadam imaginaria virtutis in vitium delapsi—habent enim, quod et Aristoteles in Ethicis meminit, vitia nonnulla cum virtutibus affinitatem, ut cum liberalitate prodigalitas, cum fortitudine audacia.

Ceterum et philosophus ille, qui nuntio de filii morte suscepto respondit scire se genuisse mortalem, imaginationem rationis habenis moderabatur, ponens se, ut philosophum decet, totum in ratione, et a sensibus atque imaginationibus abstrahens. Unde et cavillum illud in eundem facile dissuitur, quod moriturum scilicet a mortuo differt, qua de re non de morituro, sed de mortuo, dolendum. Atqui differt, si sensum, si phantasiam consulamus, nequaquam autem si rationem percunctemur, quae omnem temporis differentiam ambit atque complectitur. Quanto igitur minus timenda mors, immo quanto magis desideranda quibus corporis resurrectio votorum omnium summa; neque enim resurgere qui prius non moriatur potest; etenim vita haec ad mortem transitus est, mors autem ad veram vitam accessus.

Sed et diluendum in hoc loco argumentum illud quod maximam habere vim vulgus autumat, quoque plurimum utitur in huius vitae patrocinium adversus mortem; ferunt enim, ob id jure optimo formidandam mortem, quod ab ea Christus, dux noster, abhorruerit, cum in Evangelio legatur tristem eius animam usque ad mortem, factumque eum in agonia prolixius orantem petentemque ut, si fieri posset, passionis eum calix praeteriret. Sed facile

---

[1] *Eth. Nic.* 1104^{a}.

[2] In view of the strong influence of Cicero's *Tusc. Disp.* observable in the present chapter, I presume that this anecdote refers to Anaxagoras, as in *Tusc. Disp.* 3.14 and 3.24; but it may possibly allude to Xenophon, as Diogenes Laertius (2.55, *s. Xenophon*) tells the story. Diogenes attributes the saying (2.13, *s. Anaxagoras*) also to Anaxagoras, in connection with his children's death, and to Solon as well.

Herein only are they to be praised, in that they assented to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul by their belief that a happier and an eternal life was in store for men. They are to be condemned on the ground that they committed violence against themselves, failed to perform for themselves that expiation through just works by which everlasting happiness is secured, and fell into a fault because of some imaginary likeness in it to a virtue—for, as Aristotle reminds us in his *Ethics*, many faults have an affinity with virtues, as prodigality with liberality, and rashness with courage.[1]

Again, that famous philosopher who, upon receiving the report of his son's death, answered that he knew he had begotten a mortal,[2] was moderating his imagination by the reins of reason, depending, as a philosopher should, entirely upon reason, and withdrawing himself from the senses and from phantasies. And hence it is easy to quash that specious objection brought against him, namely that, since 'what is going to die' is one thing, and 'what is dead' another, it is still proper to grieve for one who is dead, though not for one who is 'going to die.' If we consult sense and phantasy, there is indeed a difference; but none at all when we appeal to reason, which includes and embraces all difference of time. How much the less, therefore, is death to be feared, nay how much the more to be desired by those to whom bodily resurrection is the highest of all things prayed for! He who does not first die, cannot rise again; this life is a transitional stage to death; and death, in turn, is an approach to the true life.

At this point we ought also to demolish that argument which the vulgar herd believes to be the weightiest, and most extensively uses in defense of this life as against death. They say, most rightly ought death to be dreaded, since Christ, our Leader, shrank from it, as it is related in the Gospel that his soul was sad even unto death, and as he has been pictured praying most earnestly in agony, and begging that if possible the cup of suffering pass from him.[3] But this argument is readily met; for we

---

[3] Matt. 26. 39; Luke 22. 42.

solvitur, plus enim in Christo laetitiae quam doloris de sua morte fuisse opinamur, quandoquidem sensui et imaginationi ratio et intellectus praevaluit, qua percipiebat et redimi per eam genus humanum, et suam patrisque bonitatem diffundi clarereque, et corpori suo gloriam comparari, et divinam providentiam perpendi ob id quod quaecumque de eo praedicta a prophetis fuerant ad minimum usque apicem complerentur. Quam autem habebat praetendebatque molestiam non tam de mortis horrore proveniebat, ob quam scilicet appetendam voluntarieque subeundam de caelis in uterum Mariae Virginis descenderat, quam quod, ob mortem quam sibi erat inflictura Judaeorum natio, reprobandam eam noverat, plurimosque itidem ob eandem causam ad aeterna incendia damnari. Ceterum subiit mortem Christus libentissime, quo ad superiorem, ut a Parisiensibus theologis dicitur, rationem attinet, quantum autem ad inferiorem pertinet, tristatus; sponteque, ut copiosius scilicet quam fieri posset bonitatem suam in humani generis redemptionem effunderet, sensuali parti et imaginariae potestati doloris habenas laxavit; unde etiam adversus haereticos verum eum hominem abnegantes disputantibus nobis victoria pateret, qui obicere in eorum oculos possemus doluisse eum ob imminentis mortis imaginationem, idque in eo sensum operatum, quod humanae infirmitati ascribitur. Haec itaque inter alia fuere in causa ut affici corpus suum Christus ex vehementi futurae mortis imaginatione voluerit, quamquam de ipsa, quantum scilicet ad rationem pertinet, gavisus sit. Alioquin quo modo martyribus fortior atque praestantior, quos legimus in atrocissimis

[1] The Scholastics generally distinguished between *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior*. See Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 446 ff.; B. A. Luyckx, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, in *B.G.P.M.* 23.3–4, Münster, 1923, pp. 39 ff.; E. Lutz, *Die Psychologie Bonaventuras*, in *B.G.P.M.* 6.4–5 (1909), p. 107; H. Spettmann, *op. cit.*, p. 55, n. 6. Other prominent philosophers of the University of Paris who preserved the distinction were St. Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, Duns Scotus, and Robert Kilwardby.

The higher reason was assigned to the ideal, eternal, world; the lower to the temporal world of sense and feeling. St. Thomas Aquinas (see Luyckx, *op. cit.*, p. 46, n. 51 and 52) attributed to the higher reason *sapientia*, and to the lower *scientia;* of the one, St. Bonaventure regarded Plato as representative, and of the other, Aristotle. The notion of a higher and a lower reason, developed by both Arab and Christian thinkers, had its origin in the view of Plotinus (*Enneades* 5.3.3)

are of the opinion that in Christ there was more joy than grief at his death, since his sense and imagination were excelled by his reason and intellect, and since by his reason and intellect he perceived that through his death mankind was being redeemed; his own and the Father's goodness was spreading and brightening; glory was in store for his body; and it was adjudged divine providence that whatever had been predicted concerning him by the prophets was fulfilled even to the last tittle. But the distress which he felt and asserted arose not so much from the terror of death—it was for the sake of attaining and freely undergoing death that he had descended from heaven into the womb of the Virgin Mary. His distress arose rather from the knowledge that the Jewish nation must be condemned on account of the death it was about to inflict upon him, and that great numbers likewise, and for the same cause, were being doomed to eternal fires. But Christ underwent death very willingly, in so far as the superior reason, as the theologians of Paris call it,[1] is concerned, but sadly, in so far as appertains to the inferior reason; and that he might pour out his goodness in redemption of the human race more abundantly, one may say, than was possible, he freely loosed the reins of grief from the sensory part and the imaginative faculty. Hence if we should dispute with the heretics who deny him true humanity, our victory would be manifest, since we could set before their eyes the contention that he grieved because of the image of imminent death, and that this, which is ascribed to human infirmity, was brought about in him by sense. So, among others, these causes were responsible for Christ's willingness that his body be troubled by the forcible imagination of death to come, although he rejoiced thereat so far as reason is concerned. Otherwise, in what way was he braver and more excellent than the martyrs who, we read, when placed amid the most terrible

that the soul dwells on the border between two worlds, a higher and a lower. Cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 12.1, Migne, *Pat. Lat.* 42.797 ff.: 'the higher part of reason clings to the contemplation and judgment of eternal reasonings; the lower portion is turned to the control of things temporal.'

cruciatibus positos prae jubilo mentis exsultasse, magnaque alacritate et gaudio tauros, eculeos, cruces, ignes, gladios pertulisse? Sed de morte haec satis sunto, cuius imaginatio maximum mortalibus terriculum esse solet.

Eorum enim quae diximus consideratione atque perspectu, reliqua quoque, quae afferre dolorem videntur, patere facile possunt, ut mala scilicet doloresque, quibus, ob ea ipsa, molestiam capimus, imaginationi ipsi, non autem rationi maxima ex parte ascribenda sint. Sic et amissio patrimonii aequanimiter fertur, sic et convicia et verbera, cum ab opinione imaginationem sequente dolorem infligi commonstret ratio. Quod et Epictetus in Enchiridio meminit, commonens non eum qui conviciatur aut verberat injuriam facere, sed opinionem ipsam velut injuriari, ab eaque sola homines irritari. Ceterum et praeteritae res omnes, quarum nos angit memoria, vel hoc ipso pacto examinandae a nobis sunt, ut abdicata imaginatione ratio consulatur; maximum enim ab ipsa phantasia in nos incommodum derivatur, cum id querimur et tristamur factum, quod non esse factum non potest. Ab hoc namque quasi perpetuo vulgi cruciatu rationis ope liberamur, ut quae necessaria sunt, vel ob id quod eventis jam terminata fuerunt, vel quia eventura necessario putantur, ingenue perferamus; quandoquidem de eis quae aliter ac sunt esse non possunt, consilium aut dandum aut sumendum non est.

Diximus de dolore. De voluptatibus ad eandem sententiam dicturi, quandoquidem earum exercitum et arcebimus et effugabimus rationum copiis, non secus ac et doloris machinis et irae excursionibus resistimus. Spatium igitur temporis aliquod in primis capiendum est, ut Epictetus docet, quo scilicet nos ipsos veluti saepiamus; tum volvamus animo qua voluptate potiemur,

---

[1] Chap. 5; 'When we are hindered, or distressed, or grieved, let us never blame others but ourselves, that is, our opinions.' Chap. 20: 'Remember, it is not he who reviles you or beats you that insults you, but the opinions of these things are insulting. So if a man annoys you, know that it is your own opinion that annoys you. Therefore especially try not to be carried away by the phantasy. For if once you gain time and delay, you will more easily master yourself.'

tortures exulted from jubilation of mind, and with great eagerness and joy endured to the end brazen bulls, wooden racks, crosses, fires, and swords? But let these remarks on death suffice; the imagination of it is ever the greatest source of terror to mortals.

From a survey and consideration of the things I have mentioned, the other things that seem to bring pain can easily be manifest; so that the ills and the pains, with which on their account we are vexed, are mostly to be ascribed to the imagination, and not, on the contrary, to reason. Thus even the loss of one's patrimony is borne with equanimity, and so are insults and floggings, since reason distinctly shows that the pain is inflicted through an opinion attendant upon the phantasm. This point Epictetus mentions in his *Encheiridion*,[1] bringing forcibly to mind that it is not the person who insults or beats us that does us injury, but the opinion itself injures us, if you will, and by it only are men distressed. What is more, all past events, the memory of which pains us, are to be examined by us in just this way, so that, rejecting imagination, we may take counsel of reason; for we bring upon outselves the greatest harm from this phantasy when we complain and are grieved because that has been done which cannot now be undone. And from this, so to speak, endless torture of the rabble we are released by the aid of reason, so that we freely submit to the inevitable, either because it has already occurred, or because it is expected necessarily to occur; for, of course, counsel is not to be given or received on what cannot be otherwise than as it is.

I have spoken of pain. In the same manner I shall speak of pleasures, since we shall ward off and escape the host of pleasures by the forces of reason, in a way no different from that in which we resist both the engines of pain and the sallies of wrath. First of all, then, some portion of time should be taken, as Epictetus teaches, in which, as it were, to hedge ourselves about. Then let us consider what pleasure we should enjoy, and with what

et qua jam potiti paenitentia afficiemur. Etenim, quod Aristoteles naturae interpres tertio ad Nicomachum libro commeminit, concupiscentia omnis admixta dolori est, tantumque abest ut satiet, ut etiam augmentum de frequentia capiat, et rationem proprium hominis bonum eliminet. Opponenda quoque et foedae voluptati honesta illa voluptas est, qua quis potitur, cum de illecebris carnis blandimentisque triumphaverit. Et illae Johannis Pici patrui Regulae ad vincendas voluptates excogitatae nobis ad memoriam revocandae sunt, siquidem in primis considerandum est foedam omnem voluptatem brevem et exiguam, eamque fastidium et anxietatem comitari; jacturam inde maioris boni, hoc est, internae pacis et conscientiae, sequi; vitam somno similem et umbrae instar evanescentem; mortem improvisam pro foribus astare. Ob idque, quam suspectum nobis esse debeat, ob divinae justitiae invariabilem ordinem, quem in vindictam nostra peccata cient, ne nobis paenitentiae tempus concedatur. Poenam item ante oculos ponendam duplicem, quam damni et sensus theologi nuncupant, si a voluptate vincamur, contraque, si eam debellaverimus, aeterna praemia proponenda. Demum quaenam exempla superandarum voluptatum Christus ipse et vivens et moriens quique eum secuti nobis praebuerint, quibus veluti spiritalibus armis a voluptatibus tuti[a] et eis etiam infesti sumus.

[a] uti V.

---

[1] Epictetus, *Encheiridion* 34: 'If you have conceived an image of some pleasure, guard yourself against being carried away by it. Let the thing wait for you, and permit yourself a certain delay on your part. Then think of both times—when you will enjoy the pleasure, and when, after enjoying it, you will repent and reproach yourself.'

[2] 1119^{a}.

[3] Ad Christianae vitae institutionem Regulae sive Praecepta quibus adjutus homo possit vincere mundum et tentationem; Regulae xii, partim excitantes, partim dirigentes homines in pugna spirituali,' in *Opera Omnia*, Basel, 1572, I. 332–334; cf. Sir Thomas More's versified English paraphrase (1510) of the Rules in seven-line stanzas, in Rigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–63. In this volume (pp. 89–93) there is also the English translation in prose (1534) by Sir Thomas Elyot. The 'weapons' for the fight of the spirit against sin, 'spiritualis pugnae arma xii, quae homo cum peccandi eum libido tenet, in promptu habere decet,' are the following: 1. Pleasure is brief and paltry. 2. Its companions are disgust and anxiety. 3. The loss of a greater good. 4. Life is a dream and a shadow. 5. Death, at hand and unforeseen. 6. The danger of final impenitence. 7. Eternal reward,

repentance we should repent after having enjoyed it.[1] For as Aristotle, Nature's Interpreter, calls to mind in the third book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, pain is involved in all concupiscence, and so far from being satisfied, concupiscence even takes increase from repetition, and eliminates reason, which is man's peculiar good.[2] Next, in opposition to foul pleasure must be placed that worthy pleasure which any one enjoys, when he has triumphed over the enticements and blandishments of the flesh. And we should recall to memory those *Rules*[3] for subduing temptations, devised by my paternal uncle, Giovanni Pico, since indeed we ought principally to consider that every foul pleasure is short and petty; that it is accompanied by disgust and anxiety; that from it follows the loss of a greater good—of inward peace of conscience; and that life is like unto sleep, fleeting after the fashion of a shadow, while death unforeseen stands before the doors. In this light, how apprehensive should we be lest, because of the invariable order of divine justice, which our sins provoke to vengeance, time for repentance be not vouchsafed us. Likewise the double punishment should be set before our eyes, the punishment which theologians term the 'pain of loss' and the 'pain of sense,'[4] as the consequence, if we should be overcome by the pleasure; and, on the other hand, the everlasting rewards should be pointed out, which are ours if we overcome it. And finally, it is obvious that we should have before us such examples of pleasures to be overcome as Christ himself, living and dying, and his followers have furnished us, the spiritual arms,[5] as it were, by which we are rendered safe from pleasures and even dangerous to them.

---

eternal punishment. 8. The natural dignity of man. 9. The peace of a good mind. 10. The blessings of the Lord. 11. The Cross of Christ. 12. The testimony of the martyrs, and the examples of the Saints. More (Rigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 63 ff.) also translates these, and appends an original versified amplification.

[4] Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, *Pars* 2 (*Prima pars*), *Q.* 87, *art.* 4, *Resp. ad. obj.* 3: 'Thus, in so far as sin consists in turning away from God, the punishment that corresponds is the *pain of loss*, which also is infinite, as being the loss of the infinite good, God. In so far, however, as sin turns inordinately (to the mutable good), the punishment which corresponds is the *pain of sense*, which also is finite.'

[5] See p. 74, n. 3.

Quae omnia quamquam Christiana fides, de qua in progressu operis dicturi sumus, abunde nobis tribuit, tamen et innata ratio nobis suggerit etiam et ministrat, quoties adversa nos imaginatio voluptariis titillat, sed et cum tristibus afficit—nam quamquam de dolore superius disseruimus, de ira etiam non nihil afferamus, cuius vehementiam et immanem impetum saepius quam volumus et quidem moleste experimur. Suggerit imaginatio aut inferendam aut reponendam injuriam, totumque sanguinem et praecordia in vindictam clamore ingenti quasi classico cit; opponit se ratio eo usque impetrans indutias, quoad dum jure, an injuria, id quod queritur factum sit percunctetur atque dijudicet. Itur in examen, sciscitatur ratio atque ita inter percunctandum definit, aut jure factum id quod conquereris, aut injuria. Si jure, diligendus tibi ille est qui fecit, non odio persequendus. Habendae illi atque agendae gratiae, quia in te beneficium contulit, non maleficium molitus est. Si injuria, rogandum iterum restat, si ignorantia videlicet id fecit, aut malitia. Si primum des, condonanda faciliter venia ob inscitiam delinquenti. Si secundum, non adeo illi succensendum, quia sibi ipsi in primis damna intulit, quippe cum, praeter divini judicii quae illum manet vindictam, se ipsum etiam statim poena affecerit. Jussisti namque, Augustinus[a] inquit ad Deum loquens, et ita est, ut omnis inordinatus animus sit poena sibi. Quam ob rem ad miserandum compatiendumque, potius quam ad inferenda mala, invitari debemus, siquidem cum eiusdem nobiscum naturae noster sit hostis, cumque ab ipso naturae ortu insculptum geramus, ut similes diligamus. Ex eius malo dolendi potius nobis quam laetandi seges subministratur, tantum abest ut appetentes inferendi damni simus, quo postea

[a] Augustus V.

---

[1] *Confessions* 1.12 (end); *C.S.E.L.*33 (1896) .17, ed. P. Knöll.

Although examples like all these have been furnished us in abundance by Christian faith, of which I shall speak in the course of this work, nevertheless innate reason also prompts and directs us as often as the adverse imagination tickles us with voluptuousness. And this is true also when it affects us with gloom; for although above I have already discoursed on pain, let me now make some explanation of wrath, the vehemence and powerful impulse of which we experience more often than we wish, and indeed much to our distress. Imagination suggests that an injury be either inflicted or retaliated, and moves the whole blood and body to vengeance with a great call, as with a trumpet. Reason opposes, and even obtains a truce for such interval as may allow it to investigate and decide whether the deed imagination complains of was rightly or wrongly committed. Reason has recourse to examination; it searches out, and accordingly defines in the inquiry whether the act which you lament was justifiable or not. If the act was justified, you should love him who has done it, and not pursue him with hate. You must feel grateful to him, and bestow thanks upon him, because he performed an act of beneficence toward you, and did not commit one of malice. If the act was unjustified, the question still remains: Did he certainly do it from ignorance, or from ill-will? If you impute ignorance, you must readily forgive the delinquent the sins of inexperience. If ill-will, even so you should not be angry with him, for primarily he has inflicted loss on himself, in that, besides the vengeance of divine justice awaiting him, the punishment has also indeed immediately affected himself. 'Thou hast commanded,' says Augustine, speaking to God, 'and it is so, that every disordered soul is its own punishment.'[1] We ought, therefore, to be drawn to pity and sympathy rather than to the commission of wrong, if only because our enemy is of the same nature as we, if only because from the very origin of nature we bear engraved in us the precept to love our kind. From harm to our enemy we reap an abundance of pain rather than of delight—so far is it from our attempt to inflict a loss for the sake of sub-

laetemur. Qui enim aut inferre aut referre injuriam quaerit, nihil ob aliud id quaerit, nisi ut propterea laetetur et gaudeat.

Definivit enim Aristoteles iram, cui philosophi theologique consensere, vindictae appetitum. Nihil autem appetitur nisi propter bonum, ut adepto eo laetitia exoriatur. Sed et hac ipsa ratione deponi ira nec difficulter potest, si consideraverimus de falsa imaginatione provenire, ut putemus ipsam hostis nostri naturam nobis injuriari. At non ipsa natura est proprie, non voluntas, sed naturae ipsius voluntatisque malitia; a debito namque et praestituto sibi ordine deficit atque pervertitur. Perversio autem illa atque defectus aut nihil est, si eorum sententiam sectamur qui malum nihil prorsus asseverant, aut si aliquid est, certe accidens est, non substantia. Totam ergo hominis substantiam, quae bona est, quae amabilis, aut pro nihilo, aut pro accidente solo, odisse, hominis est qui ratione careat. At si caret ratione, jam homo non est, sed brutum potius, quod huc et illuc pro imaginationis imperio trahatur. Oportet enim, quod et ab Aristotele decretum est, concupiscentiam omnem non secus audire rationi ac puerum paedagogi monitis obtemperare.

Quare cavendum nobis enixe eis quas[a] supra diximus rationibus, ne rationalem partem imaginatio corripiat, neve fulgorem eius caligo sensus obnubilet, ne mancipium dominetur; si enim servus regnum occupaverit, necesse est ut aut dominus serviat, aut exsulet, aut occumbat. Sed illud totis viribus conandum, ut pervigil ratio prae mentis foribus astet assidue, abigatque ea quae parere sibi recusent phantasmata, et si vim fecerint, optimis armata cogitatibus debellet. Ut et in hac quoque parte Evangelicum illud impleatur in nobis: Cum fortis armatus custodit atrium suum, in pace sunt omnia quae possidet.

[a] quae V.

---

[1] The dialectician's definition in *De Anima* 403^a.
[2] *Eth. Nic.* 1119b.
[3] Vulg. Luke 11.21.

sequent pleasure; for he who seeks either to inflict or return an injury seeks no other end than to be glad, and to rejoice thereat.

Now Aristotle has defined anger (and philosophers and theologians have agreed in this definition) as the effort after retaliation.[1] Yet nothing is desired except for a good, so that when the object is obtained, pleasure may arise. For this very reason, anger can easily be disarmed when we have considered that a false imagination is the source of our belief that we are injured by our enemy's very nature. Strictly, it is not nature, not the will, but the badness of nature and will, for they revolt from the order which is due and prescribed to them, and are perverted. Moreover, this perversion or defection is nothing, if we follow the opinion of those who assert that the bad has no existence at all, or, if it be something, is then surely an accidental quality of a thing, and not substantial. It is therefore characteristic of the man bereft of reason to hate the whole substance of man, which is good and lovable, instead of hating either nothing at all, or merely an accident. He who lacks reason, then, is not man, but rather a brute to be dragged hither and thither at the beck of the imagination. As also Aristotle decided, all concupiscence should hearken to reason precisely as a boy should yield to the admonitions of his tutor.[2]

We must therefore take great care, through the reasonings discussed above, that the imagination shall not seize upon the rational part, that the mist of sense shall not becloud its brilliance, and thrall become lord; for if a slave seize the throne, the master must needs turn slave, or be exiled, or die. But we must strive with all our powers to the end that everwatchful reason may incessantly stand guard before the gates of the mind, that it may repel those phantasms which refuse to obey it, and, if they offer violence, subdue them by the excellent thoughts with which it is armed. Accordingly, even in this sense also, that passage of the Gospel may be fulfilled in us: 'When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, all his goods are in peace.'[3]

[XI]

Eisdem Imaginationis Malis quae a nostro pendent Arbitrio Speculatione Intellectus optime ferri auxilium, et quo modo id fieri commode potest, edocetur. Caput XI.

Verum enimvero quanto altius ratione conscenderimus, tanto et potentius et securius phantasiae dominabimur, elevabimur enim a corporeis magis. Unde animae periculum imminet semper, ne proprium ipsius opus praepediatur, neve contagiis eorum inquinetur; siquidem maius imaginationi commercium cum ratione quam cum intellectu, omnium animae virium puriore superioreque. Ad quem cum sese reduxerit anima, veluti in propria regia tutissima etiam arce circumsepta quiescit atque perficitur. Etenim tota eius perfectio, quod et Priscianus Lydus in Theophrasti Commentationes definit, in perspicua ad se ipsam reversione, et ad intellectum conversione consistit, contraque in inclinatione ad corpora intellectus casum contingere arbitratur.

Et certe decipi ratio facilius potest atque ab imaginatione ludificari impensius quam intellectus, illius enim opus discurrere recurrereque per rerum imagines ut veri notitiam investiget, huius vero simplices rerum notas intueri. Illius usus hominis proprius est, huius autem usu quamquam homines pollent, magis tamen angelorum peculiaris, tanto ratiocinatione perfectior, quanto similior evadit Deo, qui non per discursum, non per plures easque simplices rerum notas speciesve (uti spiritus inferioris ordinis), non per unicam tantum (ut supremi), sed per propriam eamque simplicissimam essentiam, non modo res ipsas intellegit, quia sunt, sed quia intellegit, et fiunt et permanent. Quo fit ut qui huic intellegendi modo propior est, eo sit a casu atque errore distantior.

---

[1] *Metaphrasis in Theophrasti libros de sensu et de phantasia*, *De Phantasia* 6: ἐν γὰρ τῇ εἰς ἑαυτὴν στροφῇ καὶ τῇ πρὸς νουν συννεύσει ἡ τελείωσις αὐτῇ, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς τὰ σώματα ῥωπῇ ἡ τοῦ νοεῖν ἀπόστασις· F. Wimmer, *Theophrasti Eresii Opera*, Leipzig, 1862, 3.270.

CHAPTER XI

In which it is shown that for the Ills of the Imagination depending on our Will help is best brought by Intellectual Contemplation, and how this can conveniently be done

Undoubtedly the higher we ascend by reason, the more powerfully and securely shall we dominate phantasy, for we shall be raised higher above the corporeal. Hence ever imminent to the soul is the danger that its own proper work may be hindered, or that it may be soiled by contamination with the corporeal, because the imagination has more commerce with reason than with intellect, that purest and highest of all the powers of the mind. When the soul has withdrawn itself into the intellect, there, as in its own protected palace and enclosed citadel, it reposes and is perfected.

The whole perfection of the soul, as Priscianus Lydus defines it in his interpretation of the *Commentaries* of Theophrastus, consists in its clear reversion to itself, and in its convergence to the intellect; while from the inclination of the soul to what is corporeal, he thinks, comes the ruin of the intellect.[1]

Surely reason can be more easily deceived, more thoroughly tricked, by the imagination than can intellect; for it is the task of reason to run hither and thither among the images of things, in search of the knowledge of truth; but the duty of the intellect is to contemplate the simple characters of things. The exercise of the reason is peculiar to man; and though men abundantly exercise the intellect, its use is peculiar rather to the angels, and is the more perfect than ratiocination as it becomes more like to God. Not by discursion, not by the many and simple signs and appearances of things (as with the spirit of an inferior order), not by the unique essence (as with the highest spirits), but by his own, and that the most simple, essence, God cognizes the things themselves; and does not merely cognize them because they exist, but because he cognizes them, they come into existence and remain. And hence it follows that he who more nearly approaches this method of cognizing is thereby the further removed from accident and error.

Cum autem rationis opus uti sensitivarum virium officiis praestat, ita intellectus munere inferius sit, utpote quae inter phantasiae et intellectus munia collocetur, evenit interdum ut fallatur ipsa ratio, non tam ob rerum proprietates voraginibus materiae demersas, quam ob affinitatem quam cum imaginaria potestate ab ipso naturae ortu contraxit. Imperfectum enim atque imbecille in hominibus rationis lumen, ut qui infimi sint in numero intellegentium; contraque perfectior in eis fortiorque quam in ceteris animantibus imaginatio, quae continue species sensibus haustas illis suggerit, atque omnibus eorum actionibus assistit[a] comes et assecla individuus, adeoque in obeundis negotiis omnibus consors, ut sine ea nihil omnino fieri, nihil agi posse videatur. Ob idque saepenumero accidit ut eius opus a rationis intellectusque opere nonnulli discernere nescierint. Hominem novi ex affecta imaginatione adeo vacillantem, adeo nutabundum, ut de maximo illo supremoque profato, quod primum principium apud recentiores philosophos vocatur, subdubitare sibi videretur: quod de re videlicet eadem affirmatio et negatio simul verificari non possit. Quas ob res colligere possumus quod inter capitis huius initia proposuimus: eo nos securius potentiusque phantasiae dominari, quo ab ipsa magis recedemus, atque non solum in ratione, quod hominis proprium est, nos ponemus videlicet, sed in intellectu, cuius opere cum beatis angelis, hoc est, purissimis illis mentibus Deo jugiter servientibus similes, quantum per carnis licet infirmitatem, evademus.

Duo autem nobis observanda in primis, si voti compotes fieri volumus, primum ut ex altissima illa mentis specula contemplantes dinoscere queamus,[b] quinam sint et quales affectus nostri quorum impetu ducimur ad agendum. Affectus autem Alcinoo philosopho, ex Platonis dogmate referente, nihil aliud

---

[a] absistit V.

[b] quaeramus VS; corrected in S by Pico in table of *errata*.

Since the function of reason is as much inferior to the function of the intellect as it excels the offices of the sensitive powers (in accordance with its intermediate position between the functions of phantasy and intellect), it now and then happens that reason itself is deceived—less because the properties of things are sunk in the depths of matter, than because of the affinity which reason has contracted with the imaginative faculty from the very origin of nature. The light of reason is imperfect and weak in man because he is lowest in the rank of intelligent beings. The imagination, on the other hand, is in him more perfect, and stronger than in other animate beings. It continually brings up for him the impressions drawn in by the senses; it witnesses all his actions as a comrade and inseparable companion, and is so much a partner in all his affairs that, apparently, no deed or action at all can be without it. And hence it has often happened that some men have failed to distinguish the office of the imagination from that of reason and from that of intellect. I have known a man so disposed to vacillation and uncertainty from his disordered imagination that he thought he was somewhat dubious concerning the validity of that greatest and highest maxim, called by more recent philosophers the first principle, to wit, that in the same subject, at the same time, both affirmation and negation cannot be truly uttered. From these considerations we can deduce what I have set forth in the opening remarks of this chapter—that we dominate phantasy the more surely and powerfully, the further we recede from it, and place ourselves, not only in reason, which is peculiar to man, but also in intellect, by the aid of which we shall, as much as the weakness of the flesh permits, become one with the blessed angels, that is, become like those purest minds who serve God continually.

If we would gain our desire, two things primarily must have our attention: first, when we look from that lofty watch-tower of the mind, to be able to discern what the affections are by the influence of which we are led to action, and of what nature they are. The philosopher Alcinous, in his treatise on the Platonic

est quam motus animae sine ratione, boni cuiusdam aut mali gratia. Cognoscuntur autem, ut Platonicus Synesius docet, ex imaginationibus, quas praecipue promit homo, et in quibus se versat, quando a nullo pulsatur extrinsecus. Si bonis igitur imaginationibus, quae bonos affectus pariant, pulsari nos deprehendemus, restat ut eos sequamur, rationeque et intellectu et extrinseco etiam opere juvemus; si malis, aliud nobis se offert remedium, ut in sublimi illa intellectus specula positi phantasiam jugiter observemus, temerariosque illius impetus anticipemus. Enitendum enim a principio, Epictetus docet, ne nos imaginatio corripiat, tumque nostri compotes fore asseverat, cum per aliquod eam tempus continuerimus. Id autem fiet si ad bonum quodpiam objectum mentis aciem dirigemus. Quae autem illa sint objecta, quoniam in libris nostris De Morte Christi et Propria Cogitanda superioribus annis pro virili explicavimus, non est cur aliud in praesentia disseramus.

[XII]

Qua Ratione eis Phantasiae Malis, quae de Pravorum Angelorum ministerio prodeunt, providendum, quoque pacto omnibus simul Imaginationis Tenebris et Morbis solo Christianae Fidei Lumine et Unica Orationis Ope consulendum. Caput XII et ultimum.

Restat ut afferamus remedia quibus sauciam ob malorum spirituum vulnera imaginationem curemus. Ea autem quamquam multa sunt, sub unico tamen Christianae fidei lumine continentur, per quod et revelatas in sacris litteris et patefactas etiam veri Dei cultoribus praeter scripturae canonem divinas

---

[1] *De doctrina Platonis*, Oxford (Lichfield) ed. 1667, 31.27; in G. Burges, *The Works of Plato*, London (Bohn), 1854, 6.31.306.

[2] Synesius, *De Insomniis* 6 (142 B and C), Migne, *Pat. Gr.* 66.1300.

[3] *Encheiridion* 20; see p. 72, n. 1, and also p. 74, n. 1.

[4] See p. 60, n. 4.

doctrine, says: 'An affection is nothing but an irrational movement of the soul, for the sake of some good or evil.'[1] Further, as the Platonist Synesius shows, the affections are known from the phantasies which a man especially produces, and on which he dwells, when he is moved by nothing from without. If, therefore, we find ourselves moved by good phantasies of the sort that give birth to good affections, it remains for us to follow these affections, and to assist them with reason and intellect, and even with external effort. If we find ourselves moved by evil phantasies, another remedy offers itself: that in our position on that lofty watch-tower of the intellect we continually observe phantasy, and anticipate its reckless attacks.[2] As Epictetus teaches, we must from the beginning strive to prevent the imagination from corrupting us. When for some time we have repressed phantasy,[3] then, he asserts, shall we be masters of ourselves. This will happen, too, if we direct the mind's eye toward some good object. Since in my books of some years ago, *De Morte Christi et Propria Cogitanda*,[4] I have to the best of my ability explained what those objects are, there is no reason why I should here discuss them further.

CHAPTER XII, AND THE LAST

By what Reasoning we are to provide against those Evils of the Phantasy which come from the ministration of Bad Angels, and in what manner we are to prepare at once for all the Darkness and the Disorders of the Imagination by the sole Light of Christian Faith and the Unique Resource of Prayer

It remains to present the remedies by means of which to cure the imagination smitten by the wounds of evil spirits. These remedies, despite their great number, are nevertheless all comprised under the one light of Christian faith. Through it we recognize the divine verities that are revealed in Holy Writ, and are also disclosed to the worshipers of the true God beyond the

veritates agnoscimus, eiusque fulgore vivifico mortiferas imaginationum tenebras pellimus. Illud enim beneficentissimus luminum parens, Deus, quasi ducem ad nos demisit, ut et praeparata in caelis praemia, quae, ut Esaias docet, absque eo videre non possumus, commode cerneremus, et vitam hanc qua vivimus a suggestionibus fallacis daemonis tueremur. Non solum hoc ipso lumine imaginationis morbis, sed et rationis infirmitati et intellectus imbecillitati consulturus.

Siquidem duplex humani intellectus incommodum—alterum quidem ab imaginatione, de quo jam diximus, alterum ex debilitate congenita, utpote qui sicuti in genere intellegibilium ultimus, ita et imbecillior sit; quapropter superiore fortioreque lumine indiguit ut roboraretur. Fortissimum enim fidei lumen, omnique humano robore praestantius, ut rationes mittam: quod gratia naturam perficit; quod naturae donis Dei praestant dona, quae ipse per sese, non autem intercedente natura, largitur; quod infinita paene hominum millia pro Christi nomine, duce hoc lumine quo aeterna videntur, occisa sunt, qui non solum non vexati maximo animi gaudio degebant, sed et inter ipsos cruciatus positi, exsultationibus et jubilis, dum torquebantur magis, magis animi sui felicitatem indicabant. Uti ergo debemus hoc lumine adversus imaginationis vitia, non solum ob id quod fortius, quod praestantius naturali, quod ad ea pertingat monstranda nobis, ad quae nativum lumen per sese non admittatur, verum etiam quia eo multa revelata sunt nobis, in quibus meditandis non solum et ratio et intellectus perficitur, sed et phantasia ipsa non minus delectabiliter quam salubriter occupatur.

Duplex enim imaginatio, velut significantius dixerim, duplex in homine imaginationis gradus: humanus videlicet et brutalis.

---

[1] Chap. 9.

canon of Scripture; and by its quickening ray we dispel the fatal shadows of phantasses. God, the most beneficient Father of Light has sent that light down to us as a guide to our ready perception of the rewards prepared in heaven, of which, as Isaiah shows us,[1] without this light we can have no vision, and to our protection of this life we live from the suggestions of the treacherous demon. With this same light God has meant to guard us against the infirmity of reason and the weakness of the intellect as well as against the disorders of the imagination.

There are two disadvantages in the human intellect—one owing to the imagination, and of this I have just spoken; the other owing to an innate disability, in that, as the last in the order of intelligences, it is therefore the weakest. Because of this double disadvantage, the intellect required strengthening by a higher and more powerful light. Indeed, the light of Faith is very powerful, and excels all human might. This we may assert without elaborating the reasons: (1) that Grace perfects nature; (2) that the gifts of nature are surpassed by the gifts of God, which he bestows, not through the intervention of nature, but of and through himself; (3) that, as I may say, endless myriads of men, led by this light by which the eternal is visible, have died for the name of Christ—men who lived with the greatest joy of mind when unmolested, and when placed among the very implements of crucifixion, by jubilations and hallelujahs, the more they were tortured, would all the more display their beatitude of mind. Consequently we ought to make use of this light against the defects of the imagination, not merely because it is stronger, because it is more excellent than the light of nature, because it reaches the demonstration to us of those things to which the light imparted by birth is not of itself admitted; not only for these reasons, but also because through its means many revelations have been made to us, in the contemplation of which reason and intellect are perfected, and phantasy itself is also engaged not less delightfully than beneficially.

There really is a double imagination in man; or, I should more clearly say, there are two degrees of imagination, the brutish and

Nam ad pleraque humana se extendit imaginatio ad quae brutalis non pervadit; neque enim ad ornatum, ad ambitionem, ad honores proprie commeat, tametsi animalia quaepiam huiusce modi delectari videntur, ut equus faleris et tubarum sonitu, blanditiis canes. Hac pueri potissimum ducuntur; illa etiam grandaevi. Lumen autem fidei, divinae scripturae veritates naturae lumini impervias perspectas faciens, utrique imaginationi maximo usui est, adminiculaturque et manuducit quasique supra naturam suam rapit et elevat. Proponit enim pueris, qui imaginatione ea plurimum vivunt quam brutalem diximus (ut historias et bella mittamus, quibus remorari simul et delectari possunt) inferorum poenas et incendia, paradisi praemia atque delicias, et haec omnia modo quodam imaginativae potestati congruentissimo, ut quae facile concipiantur nec difficulter retineantur. Hinc enim offert lacus ignis et sulfuris, tortores, daemonas, et cetera eius modi; inde aurea supernae Hierosolymae moenia pretiosis lapidibus redimita, caelestes mensas, Agni nuptias, beatorum consortia, psallentes angelorum choros concinnas voces, et quaecumque id genus per sacros codices sparsa. Quo fit ut pueri his delectentur, illis vero tristentur et terreantur, utrisque vero, veluti rebus maximis, et moneantur simul et a pravis imaginibus abducantur, quod plurimum habet momentum in pueris ad veram religionem medullitus imbibendam; idque Johannes Gerson memoriae prodidit, in exemplum revocans pios quosdam parentes qui poma infantibus de tecto mittebant, ut in Deum, in quem acceptum referri[a] debere munus praedicabant, pietate debita a teneris, quod aiunt, unguiculis animarent.

[a] referre S.

---

[1] Cf. Richard of St. Victor, Bundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–6.

[2] I have not found this reference in the works of Gerson. But for illustration of his well-known delight in teaching children, see his tractate *De Parvulis Trahendis ad Christum*, *Opera Omnia*, Antwerp, 1706, 3. 277 ff.; J. B. Schwab, *Johannes Gerson*, Würzburg, 1858, pp. 691 ff.; L'Abbé La Fontaine, *Jehan Gerson*, Paris, 1906, pp. 291 ff.

[3] That is, from earliest infancy.

the human. For the human imagination reaches many things to which the brutish does not penetrate; for example, the brutish does not, properly speaking, extend to decoration, to ambition, to honors, notwithstanding that animals seem to be delighted with some things of this sort, as the horse with his trappings and with the sound of the trumpet, and dogs with caressing. Children chiefly follow the brutish type of imagination; old people the human type. The light of Faith, however, making perspicuous the verities of Holy Writ that are impervious to the light of nature, is of the greatest service to either type of imagination. It supports and conducts each by the hand, sweeping each up, so to speak, and elevating it above its own nature. For example, it places before the youth, who live for the most part in that imagination which we have called the brutish (I merely mention the tales of war, by which they can be made to linger, charmed)—it places before them the punishments and fires of Hell, the rewards and delights of Paradise;[1] and all these in a way which is most agreeable to the imaginative power, so that they are easily comprehended and with no difficulty retained. It presents, on the one hand, the lakes of fire and brimstone, tortures, demons, and the like; on the other hand, the golden ramparts of the Heavenly Jerusalem, girt with precious stones, celestial banquets, the marriage of the Lamb, the societies of the blessed, choruses of angels chanting harmonious tunes, and whatever scenes of this kind there are, scattered through Holy Writ. As a result, children are delighted by the one, and saddened and terrified by the other. And by both, in fact, as things of the greatest importance, they are warned, and at the same time led away from evil images, because there usually exists in the young an impulse towards absorbing true religion from its very heart. This truth Jean Gerson has recorded,[2] calling to mind as an example certain pious parents who would throw fruit to their children from the roof, to inspire them, from their tender finger-nails,[3] as the phrase is, with due piety to God, to whom, they would declare, the children should ascribe the gift they had received. And I have discovered

Expertus et ego in Johanne Thoma filio eiusce modi res identidem ei a vidua quapiam narratas fuisse in causa ut non solum a plerisque imaginationibus vanis, quas septennis aetas qua nunc vivit plurimum ferre solet, ex proposito abstinuerit, sed et multa quae etiam maturae aetati convenire posse videntur renuerit, spe magna fretus scandendi caelum ad illas res contemplandas quas imaginatione concepit. Eius modi namque imaginibus moventur impensius pueri quam persuasionibus ullis aut rationibus, quarum minime capaces sunt. Quis enim ambigat pueros ab patrando homicidio abhorrere vehementius, si in eorum phantasiam irrepserit effigies hominis cruentati crudeliterque perfossi dilaniatique, si metus invaserit apparendi eius, atque se, vel nocte, vel interdiu, cum solus erit, persequendi, quam si Dei naturaeque praeceptum proponatur, nocendum nemini, quam si id ingeratur, quod divina lege cautum est, ne quis auctoritate propria quemquam trucidet?

Contraque quis neget, per ea quae narravimus similiaque eis proposita gaudia, ad bene agendum animari illos quodam modo et impelli magis quam philosophorum rationibus et theologorum adhortamentis? Qui vero florente juventa sunt, quia brutales imaginationes nondum ex toto exuerunt, tum enim (quod maxime saeculorum fert abusus) tactus et gustus voluptates quaerunt, quae ferinae brutalesque ab Aristotele in Ethicis appellantur, juvari facile possunt, frenarique in eis atque etiam eliminari voluptuosa phantasmata, si earum rerum quas diximus imagines concipiantur, quae et ipsae ad sensus pertinent. Homines vero aetate provecti atque grandaevi eisdem ipsis etiam juvari possunt, sed et aliis etiam quae magis propria sunt, et quibus ambitioni, avaritiae, et reliquis vitiis quae spiritalia

---

[1] The eldest son (1492–1567), who, according to Miss Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 55, inherited some of his father's tastes and talents. Gianfrancesco supervised his education even from exile at Novi after 1502, when the son was held as hostage at Mirandola.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* 1118^{a-b}.

by experience with my son Giantommaso[1] that stories of this nature repeatedly told him by a certain widow have had this effect: not only has he intentionally abstained from many vain phantasies to which the seventh year, his present age, is exceedingly wont to give rise, but he has even rejected many which seem possibly concomitant with a mature age, relying on the great hope of ascending to heaven for the contemplation of those visions which he has conceived in imagination. Children are more earnestly moved by images of this character than by any convictions or reasonings; of the latter they are not at all capable. Now who doubts that a child more strongly abhors the commission of homicide if into his phantasy has crept the likeness of the blood-stained victim, cruelly transfixed and torn to pieces—if into his phantasy has rushed the fear of the reappearance of this likeness to pursue him, whether by night or by day, when he is alone—than if the precept of God and nature, that injury should be done to no one, is set before him, and there is forced upon him the prohibition of divine law that no one should slay another on his own authority?

And, on the other hand, who would deny that, through those joys we have mentioned, and similar joys represented to them, children are somehow more animated, more impelled to right action, than through the reasonings of philosophers and the exhortations of theologians? When youth is in its bloom, it has not yet entirely shaken off brutish phantasies, since at that period—a thing for which the abuse of ages is especially responsible—it seeks the pleasures of taste and touch, which in the *Ethics*[2] Aristotle calls bestial and brutish. These youths can easily be gratified, and their voluptuous phantasms restrained or actually eliminated, if once they conceive images of such things as we have mentioned, which also themselves appertain to the senses. Indeed men fairly advanced in life, and even actually aged, can be gratified by these same phantasms, as also by others more appropriate to their years, by means of which specific resistance is offered to ambition, avarice, and other so-called

vocantur, specialiter resistatur. Si videlicet commeminerint in desideriis peccatorem semper esse, nec oculum satiari visu, nec aurem auditu; si vanitatum plena omnia, et quod universa vanitas omnis homo vivens; si praeterire figuram mundi huius; si hominibus mori semel statutum; si caelum novum et terram novam; si universale districtumque judicium; et reliquis quae sacra tradunt eloquia mentem si adhibuerint, facile ab honorum ambitu et auri cupidine temperabunt.

Quae quisque experiri potest optima esse remedia adversus imaginationes pravas et alas quasdam ad aeterna divinaque contemplanda. Remoto namque sacrorum eloquiorum cortice, sequestratoque imaginationis velo, quod cortici litterae juxta proportionem[a] quadrat, sicuti spiritus ipse sub cortice delitescens depurato phantasmatibus intellectui respondet, sese in animam infert spiritus, eamque ad divinum gustum perducit, quae incohatio est quaedam futurae gloriae quae revelabitur in nobis. Ceterum non solum hoc lumine, quod, sacris inclusum litteris veluti cornea testa circumdatum, in obscura hac et illuni[b] nocte nobis affulget, imaginationis tenebras fugabimus, verum etiam et doctorum simul et sanctorum hominum lucernulis, quas olim summo studio ad huius luminis fulgorem evigilantes et sibi et nobis accenderunt; quibus haerendum, cum ecclesiae consensu comprobatae fuerint. Sed qua nos fide illis astringere debeamus, quotque eorum ordines reperiantur, quive inter eos proponendi, ad praesens verba facturi non sumus, quando materiam hanc in Theorematibus nostris De Fide et Ordine Credendi prosecuti sumus.

Illud autem non omittendum, eosdem nos conceptus procurare nobis oportere, quibus affectos eos fuisse credimus quorum

[a] proportione VS.
[b] illumi VS.

---

[1] Eccles. 1.

[2] From this figure I assume that the spirit of Scripture would appear through anagogical interpretation, rather than literal, tropological, or allegorical. Cf. H. Caplan, 'The Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching,' in *Speculum* 4. 3 (July, 1929), pp. 282–290.

spiritual vices. If, as you can see, they will bear in mind that the sinner is always in ardent desire, that neither is the eye satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; if they will remember that everything is full of vanity,[1] and that all living mankind is universal vanity; that the phantom of this world is fleeting; if they will recall that it has been decreed that men die but once; if they will recollect the new heaven and the new earth, the severe and universal judgment; if they will apply the mind to the other things which the sacred communications bequeath; then will they readily abstain from corrupt office-seeking and the greed for gold.

Every one can, from experience, learn that these are the best remedies against perverse imaginings, and are as wings for the contemplation of the eternal and the divine. Remove the bark of the Sacred Scriptures, lay aside the curtain of the imagination—which is to the bark of the letter what the intellect purified of phantasms is to the spirit hid beneath the bark[2]—and the spirit introduces itself into the soul, and guides it to a divine foretaste, which is a beginning of the future glory to be revealed in us. But we shall escape the darkness of imagination, not merely by this light, which, enclosed in Sacred Scripture as though covered by a horny shell, shines forth on us in this dark and moonless night, but also by the lesser lamps of the learned men and saintly, lamps which they, ever-watchful, and supremely zealous for the splendor of this light, formerly kindled for themselves and us. To these lamps we must cling, since they have been acknowledged by the consent of the Church. But with what faith we should bind ourselves to them, how many orders of them are found, or which among them are to be proposed, I do not at present intend to discuss, since I have pursued this theme in my *Theoremata de Fide et Ordine Credendi.*[3]

Still, I must not fail to say that we should attend to the same concepts by which we believe they were influenced whose prin-

---

[3] This book of twenty-six propositions (dedicated to Pope Julius II) is included in the Strassburg collection of Gianfrancesco Pico's works to which *S* belongs. The date of publication inscribed at the end of the *Theoremata* is December 22, 1506; so far as I can ascertain, it had not previously been published.

praecepta sectamur, quorum vitam imitandam nobis proposuimus; alioquin picae vel simiae magis quam imitatores homines inveniemur. Id ipsumque Epictetus faciendum monuit, eumque qui in aspera quapiam imaginatione positus sit optime agere, opinatur, si id peragat, quod aut Socratem aut Zenonem, si in id discriminis incidissent, facturos fuisse arbitretur.

Id ego tam in secundis fortunae flatibus, quam in adversis reflatibus observandum censeo, non ad Socratis Zenonisque sed ad sanctissimorum Christianorum imitationem, qui et lubricam appetentiae vim et tumidum irascentiae furorem non continendum modo docuerunt alienae rationis obicibus, verum etiam, utpote eorum injuriam frequentissime experti, propriis viribus frenaverunt. At quia debiles nimium nostrae vires ad ea quae nobis conducere diximus adipiscenda, Dei auxilium desuper implorandum est. Quod cum aderit, omnia rite, cum aberit, perperam omnia gerentur a nobis. Aderit autem semper, si pro eo impetrando ad Christum, Deum, hominumque et Dei mediatorem, preces effuderimus, qui etiam non vocatus saepissime adest, qui ad nostri cordis hostium assidue pulsat, qui orare oportere nos docuit, et ad importunitatem usque, sub typo viduae injustum judicem exorantis, qui denique daturum se pollicitus est quod quaereremus, suprema omnium causa, summum bonum, creator, redemptor, pater.

Per hoc igitur orandi studium, praeter id quod impetramus quod quaerimus, si ad consequendam salutem id faciat, hoc etiam commodo imaginationem fovemus, quod ipsa etiam per intellectus elevationem, quantum ei per corpoream suam naturam licet, in Deum conscendit. Tumque Davidicum illud in nobis completur: Cor meum et caro mea exsultaverunt in Deum vivum; et illud item: Sitivit in te anima mea, quam multipliciter tibi et caro mea; per cor enim anima, per carnem sensualis vis prae-

[1] Cf. *Encheiridion* 33. Epictetus thus counsels a man who is about to meet his superior.

[2] Luke 18. 1–7.

[3] Cf. Matt. 7. 7; Luke 11. 9.

[4] Ps. 84.2.

[5] Vulg. Ps. 62.2; cf. Auth. Vers. 63.2.

ciples we follow, and whose life we have set up for our imitation. Otherwise we shall be discovered to be magpies or apes rather than men and true emulators. This is the same advice for conduct as Epictetus has given. It is his opinion also that he who finds himself in some distressing phantasy does best if he sets about doing what he thinks either Socrates or Zeno would have done had they fallen into the same straits.[1]

I think this advice must be heeded in favoring blasts of fortune quite as much as in adverse counterblasts, after the example, not of Socrates and Zeno, but of the most saintly Christians who not only taught that the slippery impulse of appetite, and the swelling violence of anger, ought to be kept in check by the barriers of another's reason, but, having very often experienced the harm of these vices, did restrain them, and by their own powers. But because our powers are too weak to secure those things which, as I have said, are profitable to us, we must implore the aid of God from above. If his aid is present, we shall perform everything properly; if it is absent, everything imperfectly. His aid, however, will always be present, if for its attainment we pour out prayers to Christ, who is God, and Mediator between men and God; who is most often present even when not invoked; who continually knocks at the door of our heart; who has taught us that we ought to pray, and, under the parable of the widow prevailing upon the unjust judge,[2] to pray even to importunity; and who, finally, has promised that what we ask shall be given us[3]; he, the Supreme Cause of All Things, the *Summum Bonum*, Creator, Redeemer, and Father.

Besides gaining our requests, when they tend to the achievement of salvation, by a zeal for prayer we foster the imagination with this advantage also, that it too, so far as its corporeal nature allows, through the elevation of the intellect ascends to God. And then that sentiment of David is fulfilled in us: 'My heart and my flesh crieth out for the living God';[4] and that other also: 'My soul thirsteth for thee; my flesh longeth for thee, O how many ways!'[5] Here by the 'heart' is meant the soul, and

cipueque imaginaria potestas denotatur. Ex concepto quoque in intellectu atque voluntate divini amoris ardore, in sensum calor redundat, qui terrena omni humiditate consumpta caelestem accendit sitim et ad vivum illum fontem perducit, de cuius aqua qui gustaverit, sicuti ad Samaritanam mulierem dictum est, non sitiet iterum terrenorum siti, sed fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam. Ubi inebriabimur ab ubertate domus Dei eiusque voluptatis torrente potabimur. Et quidem si sacras litteras diligenter perlegerimus, si Acta eorum volvemus virorum, aut qui Christum nondum ex virgine natum vel fide tantum, vel prophetico etiam lumine, praeviderunt, aut qui natum passumque, vel sanguinis effusione, vel verbis tantum, testati sunt, fiet nobis extra omnem controversiam liquidum nil magis fuisse eis curae quam orandi studium. Sed quid de summi Dei cultore populo dicimus, quando et gentes ipsae tam Mosaicae legis umbra quam Evangelii splendore destitutae vota, hymnos, preces, supplicationes frequentabant, ut Pythagorici, Platonicique, fere omnes ac barbarae etiam nationes—Indi, Persae, atque Aethiopes? A quibus tanto magis vinci nos pudeat, quanto et quod orandum nobis est et quid orandum, non a solo naturae instinctu suapte sponte Deum quaerentis, sed ab ipso Deo jam invento et cognito sumus edocti. Quod si Plato censuit eum non despici qui conatur ut justus evadat, quod nostrum opprobrium, quae ignominia, clementiam spernere hortantis identidem et adjuvantis nos Dei, per sacramenta permonita, per occultos afflatus.

Sed de his hactenus—satis enim beneque actum imbecillitati nostrae videtur, divina favente clementia, haec ipsa de imaginatione disputavisse, deque ipsius nomine, de essentia, de proprietatibus plurimis, deque eius vitiis potissimum et remediis, quasi per otium quod a publicis impetravimus negotiis disseruisse. Deo laus et gloria sempiterna.

[1] John 4.14.
[2] For example, *Republic* 621.

FINIS

by the 'flesh' the faculty of sense, and especially the power of imagination. Also from the ardor of divine love, conceived in the intellect and in the will, there overflows into sense the heat which, with the consumption of all earthly humidity, kindles the heavenly thirst, and guides to that living fountain of whose water whosoever drinketh, as was said of the Samaritan woman, shall never thirst with the thirst of earthly beings; but the water 'shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life.'[5] Then shall we be sated from the fruitfulness of God's house, and be made to drink from the torrent of its delight. And, for sure, if we carefully read the Sacred Scriptures, and if we turn to the Acts of those men who either foresaw Christ not yet born of the Virgin (be it by faith only, be it by prophetic light as well), or who testified to the birth and passion of Christ (be it by the shedding of blood, be it by words alone), it will clearly appear to us, beyond all controversy, that no greater concern was theirs than zeal in prayer. But why speak of a people that worships God on high, when even races, as destitute of the shadow of the Mosaic Law as they were of the splendor of the Gospel, used to repeat vows, hymns, prayers, and supplications, for example, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, and almost all the barbarous nations as well—Indians, Persians, and Ethiopians? To be surpassed by such should shame us the more because we have learned both that we ought to pray, and what to pray, not from the sole instinct of a nature spontaneously seeking God, but from God himself, now the Ascertained and the Known. If Plato held that a man is not to be despised who attempts to become upright,[2] what shame is ours, what ignominy, if we spurn the kindness of God, who continually encourages and sustains us by means of prescribed sacraments, and through secret inspirations.

But so much for these reflections. To my weakness it seems that I have done well enough, with the favor of divine clemency, to have held this present discussion on imagination, to have discoursed on its name, its nature, its many properties, and especially on its faults and their remedies, in the respite, as it were, which I have obtained from public affairs.

Praise be to God, and glory everlasting.

THE END

INDEX

[References to Gianfrancesco Pico, and to the treatise *De Imaginatione*, are omitted.]

Acts, Book of 57, 97
Alberto Pio 1, 7, 12n., 13
Alberto Pio, the elder 13
Albertus Magnus 35n., 37n.
Alcinous 3, 64n., 83
Alde Manuce, Firmin-Didot's 7n.
Aldine Aristotle, the 38n.
Aldo 7, 12n., 13, 15
Alexander VI 18n.
Alexander of Aphrodisias 3, 34n., 35
Alexander of Hales 70n.
Alexandri De Anima, Bruns' ed. 34n.
Ambrose 3, 65
Amos 57
Anatomy of Melancholy, Burton's 2n., 44n.
Anaxagoras 68n.
Apocalypse 57
Aquinas 3, 35, 36n., 56n., 70n., 75n.
Arabian philosophers 3, 27, 40n.
Ariosto 1
Aristotle 3, 4, 5, 12n., 25, 27, 33, 35, 35n., 37n., 38n., 39, 40n., 41, 43, 47, 53, 55, 55n., 65, 69, 70n., 75, 79, 91
Aristotle, De Anima, Hicks' ed. 40n.
Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, tr. by Ogle 34n.
Aristotle's Psychology, Hammond's 34n., 40n.
Aristotle's Psychology, Wallace's 34n., 40n.
Art of Medicine, Avicenna's 35n.
Augustine 3, 67n., 71n., 77
Averroes 3, 4, 36n., 37
Avicenna 3, 35n., 36n., 37

Bacon, Roger 35n.
Baeumker 36n.
Baïf 10
Beare 4n., 34n.
Bellanti 54n.
Bembo 1, 5n.
Bible 43, 57, 85, 87, 89, 93, 97
Biblioteca Modenese, Tiraboschi's 8, 15n., 54n.
Blake 6
Boethius 4, 28n.
Bolzani 12n.
Bonaventure 29n., 37n., 70n.
Brett 2, 2n.
Bruns 34n.
Bundy 29n., 36n., 37n., 56n.
Burges 84n.
Burton 2n., 44n.

Calcagnini 1
Callimachus 67n.
Ceretti 19n.
Charles VIII 18n., 20n.
Christ 21, 67, 69, 71, 75, 87, 95, 97
Cicero 3, 53, 67n.
Cittadini da Faenza 1, 66n.
Cleombrotus 67, 67n.
Climacus 60n.
Climax 61
Commentary on the Psalms, Gianfrancesco Pico's 15n.
Commentary on the Psalms, Giovanni Pico's 15
Confessions, Augustine's 76n.
Creuzer 60n.
Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, Spingarn's 2n.

David 95
De Anima, Alexander's 35
De Anima, Aristotle's 2, 4, 26n., 27n., 28n., 33, 38n., 39n., 40n., 47, 53, 55n., 78n.
De Anima, Avicenna's 36n.
De Anima, Melanchthon's 2
De Animae Immortalitate Digressio, Pico's 10
De Animalium Generatione, Aristotle's 53
De Bono Mortis, Ambrose's 65
De Civitate Dei, Augustine's 67n.

De Doctrina Platonis, Alcinous' 64n., 84n.
De Fato, Cicero's 52n.
De Fide Theoremata, Pico's 7
De Imaginatione, tr. by Baïf 10
De Insomniis, Synesius' 36n., 84n.
De Insomniis, Themistius' 35
De Iuventute, Aristotle's 34n.
De Memoria, Themistius' 34
De Memoria, Aristotle's 34n.
De Morte Christi et Propria Cogitanda, Pico's 7, 13n., 61, 85
De Mystica Theologia, Gerson's 61
De Natura Deorum, Cicero's 53
De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle's 34n., 36n.
De Parvulis Trahendis ad Christum, Gerson's 88n.
De Passionibus Animae, Gerson's 61
De Rerum Praenotione, Pico's 7, 13n.
De Studio Divinae et Humanae Philosophiae, Pico's 7, 13n.
De Trinitate, Augustine's 71n.
De Uno et Ente, Giovanni Pico's 67
Defensio de Uno et Ente, Pico's 7, 66n.
Democritus 47
Deniset 2n.
Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras, Luyckx's 70n.
Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen, Schneider's 29n.
Die Psychologie Bonaventuras, Lutz's 36n., 70n.
Diogenes Laertius 67n., 68n.
Disputationes adversus Astrologos, Giovanni Pico's 54n.
Donato 34n., 35
Dryden 5

Ecclesiastes 92n.
Elyot 74n.
Empedocles 27, 47
Encheiridion, Epictetus' 64n., 73, 74n., 84n., 94n.
Enneades, Plotinus' 70n.
Epictetus 3, 65, 73, 74n., 85, 94n., 95
Epistolae, Pico's 7
Ethics, Aristotle's. *See Nicomachean Ethics.*
Ethiopians 97
Eusebius Pamphili 16n., 17
Expositio textus Decreti de Consecratione Distinctio II Hilarii, Pico's 7

Faenza, da. See Cittadini
Ficino 1
Firmin-Didot 7n., 12n.
Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching, The, Caplan's 92n.
Freeman 16n.
French, the 53
Fyens 2n.

Galen 4, 34n., 35, 35n.
Genesis 42n.
Germans, the 53
Gerson 3, 60n., 61, 88n., 89
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Rigg's 66n.
Giraldi 1, 9, 20n.
Gospel 69, 79, 97
Greswell 34n., 54n., 55n., 66n.
Guarini 1

Hain 8
Hammond 26n., 34n., 40n.
'Hegesiacs' 67n.
Hegesias 67
Hell 89
Hicks 40n.
Hobbes 5
Holland 16n., 18n.
Homer 27

In Platonis Alcibiadem Priorem Commentarii, Proclus', Creuzer's ed. 60n.
Indians 97
Isaac of Stella 29n.
Isaiah 87
I. T. 28n.

Jehan Gerson, La Fontaine's 88n.
Jerusalem, the Heavenly 89
Jewish nation, the 71
Johannes Gerson, Schwab's 88n.
John 96n.
Julius II, Pope 93n.
Justini Liber ad Gentes in Latinam Conversus, Pico's 7

Kilwardby 70n.
Knobloch 7
Krebs-Schmalz 17n.
Kühn 34n.

La Fontaine 88n.
Latin interpreters of Aristotle, the 35
Leo X 21n.
Libellus de imitatione 5n.
Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, A History of, Spingarn's 5n.
Litta 13n.
Locke 40n.
Louis XI 16n.
Lucretius 12n
Luke 57, 68n., 78n., 94n.
Lutz 36n., 37n., 70n.
Luyckx 70n.

Maimonides 56n.
Malebranche 2n., 44n.
Mantuano 1
Matthew 68n., 94n.
Maximilian I 8, 17, 18n., 20n.
Maximilian I, Holland's 16n.
Meiners 66n.
Melanchthon 2
Meno, Plato's 42n.
Metaphysics, Aristotle's 39
M. I. L. H. 8
Moors, the 53
More 74n., 75n.
Mosaic Law, the 97
Murray 67n.

Neoplatonism 3, 4
Neoplatonists, the 6
Niceron 54n.
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's 3, 55, 64n., 65, 68n., 69, 75, 78n., 90n.

Ogle 34n.

Panegyrics of the Empire, The Latin, Caplan's 16n.
Panegyrists of the Fourth Century, The, Freeman's 16n.
Paradise 89
Parisian Scholastics 3, 43, 71
Paul 67
Peripatetics, the 3, 33
Persians 97
Peutinger 1
Phaedo, Plato's 47, 67n.
Philebus, Plato's 26n., 64n.
Philippians, Epistle to the 66n., 67
Philosophiae Consolatio, Boethius' 28n.
Pico, Anton Maria 20n.
Pico, Federico 20n.
Pico, Galeotto 1
Pico, Giantommaso 21n., 91
Pico, Giovanni 3, 12n., 15, 54n., 55, 66n., 67, 75
Pico, Lodovico 20n.
Pirckheimer 1
Plato 3, 4, 25, 27, 42n., 47, 97
Platonists, the 33, 43, 97
Plotinus 70n.
Poetics, Aristotle's 5
Politian 5n., 66n.
Priscianus Lydus 3, 81
Proclus 3, 61
Psalms 44n., 45, 94
Ptolemy I 67n.
Pythagoras 47
Pythagoreans, the 97

Rand 28n.
Republic, Plato's 96n.
Reuchlin 1
Richard of St. Victor 88n.
Richards 1n., 13n., 15n., 20n., 21n., 90n.
Rigg 66n., 74n.
Rules, Giovanni Pico's 75

Sadoleto 1
Samaritan woman, the 97
Savonarola 5, 5n., 21n.
Scala Paradisi, John Climacus' 60n.
Schenkl 65n.
Schneider 29n., 35n., 36n., 70n.
Scholastic philosophers, the 3, 37n., 40n., 70n. See Parisian Scholastics
Schürer 7
Schwab 88n.
Scotus, Duns 70n.
Sforza 20n.
Siebeck 35n.
Smith, L. P. 5n.
Socrates 95
Solon 68n.
Sophist, Plato's 26n.
Spanish, the 53
Spengel 34n.
Spettmann 36n., 70n.
Spingarn 2n., 5n.
Stadler 35n.
Staurostichon, Pico's 7
Stewart 28n.

Storia della Letteratura Italiana, Tiraboschi's 13n.
Strozzi 1
Suidas 12n., 26n., 27
Summa Theologica, Aquinas' 34n., 75n.
Synesius 3, 36n., 37, 84n., 85

Thales 47
The Works of Plato, Burges' 84n.
Themistius 3, 27, 34n., 35
Theophrasti Eresii Opera, Wimmer's ed. 80n.
Theoremata de Fide et Ordine Credendi, Pico's 93
Tiraboschi 8, 9, 10, 13n., 15n., 54n.
Tusculanae Disputationes, Cicero's 67n., 68n.
Turini 1n.

Valla 5n.
Vicomercati 2n.
Vienna, University of 16n.
Villari 5n.
Virgin, the 71, 97
Vita J. Pici, Pico's 7

Wallace 34n., 40n.
Welack 8
Wimmer 80n.
Wimpfeling 1
Winter 36n.
Wisdom, Book of 53
Wordsworth 6

Xenophon 68n.

Zechariah 57
Zeno 47, 95

CORNELL STUDIES IN ENGLISH

I. A Bibliography of Thomas Gray. Clark Sutherland Northup. $3.00.

II. The Influence of Horace on the Chief English Poets of the Nineteenth Century. Mary Rebecca Thayer, Ph.D. $1.00

III. The Dramatic Records of Sir Henry Herbert, Master of the Revels. Joseph Quincy Adams. $2.50.

IV. A Geographical Dictionary of Milton. Allan H. Gilbert, Ph.D. $3.50.

V. Italian Social Customs of the Sixteenth Century and their Influence on the Literatures of Europe. Thomas Frederick Crane. $6.00.

VI. The Jonson Allusion-Book, a Collection of Allusions to Ben Jonson from 1597 to 1700. Jesse Franklin Bradley, Ph.D., and Joseph Quincy Adams. $5.00.

VII. The Ecclesiastical Sonnets of William Wordsworth, a Critical Edition. Abbie Findlay Potts, Ph.D. $3.00.

VIII. Milton's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art; an Essay; with a Collection of Illustrative Passages from his Works. Ida Langdon, Ph.D. $2.00.

IX. A Register of Bibliographies of the English Language and Literature. Clark Sutherland Northup, with Contributions by Joseph Quincy Adams and Andrew Keogh. $5.00.

X. Plays and Masques at Court during the Reigns of Elizabeth, James, and Charles. Mary Susan Steele, Ph.D. $4.00.

XI. A Bibliography of the Poetics of Aristotle. Lane Cooper and Alfred Gudeman. $2.00.

XII. Milton on Education; the Tractate Of Education, edited with an Introduction and Notes; with Supplementary Extracts from other Writings of Milton. Oliver Morley Ainsworth, Ph.D. $2.75.

CORNELL STUDIES IN ENGLISH

XIII. A Dictionary of Actors and of Other Persons Associated with the Public Representation of Plays in England before 1642. Edwin Nungezer, Ph.D. $5.00.

XIV. Elizabeth Gaskell. Gerald DeWitt Sanders, Ph.D. $3.50.

XV. The Latin Poems of John Milton, edited with an Introduction, an English Translation, and Notes. Walter MacKellar, Ph.D. $3.00.

XVI. Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola On the Imagination; the Latin Text, with an Introduction, an English Translation, and Notes. Harry Caplan. $1.00.

XVII. The Poetics of Aristotle in England. Marvin Theodore Herrick, Ph.D. $1.75.

DATE DUE

~~APR 7 '64~~

~~JUN 1 5 1995~~

~~MAY 1 '64~~

~~MAY 1 5 '64~~

~~OCT 1 6~~

~~FACULTY~~

~~FEB~~ [illegible]

~~APR 4 '72~~

~~JUN 5 72~~

~~APR 1 '73~~

~~DEC 7 '73~~

[illegible]

[illegible]

~~JUN 1 5 1983~~

JUN 1 5 1984

~~JUN 1 5 1985~~

~~JUN 1 5 1986~~

GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S.A.

BF408 .P59
On the imagination;

Princeton Theological Seminary–Speer Library

1 1012 00104 3001